Hamood ur Rehman Commission Report
The Commission is headed by the Chief Justice
of Pakistan, Mr. Justice Hamoodur Rahman. The other two members of the
Commission are Mr. Justice S. Anwarul Haq, Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan
and Mr. Justice Tufail Ali Abdur Rahman, Chief Justice of Sindh and Baluchistan
High Court. Lt. Gen (Retd) Altaf Qadir and Mr. M.A Latif, Assistant Registrar
of the Supreme Court of Pakistan are Military Adviser and Secretary of
the Commission, respectively. The Commission which had started its proceedings
in camera in Rawalpindi on the 1st February, 1972 recorded evidence of
213 witnesses.
Lt Gen. Niazi
signing the instrument of surrender in Dhaka
with India's then Eastern
Command,
Lt. Gen, Jagjit Singh Arora, 1971
After the prisoners of war and the civil
personnel who had also been interned with the military personnel in India
returned to Pakistan [in 1974], the Commission[ recommenced] the
enquiry. In the meantime a number of questionnaires were issued to various
persons, including those who were at the helm of affairs in East Pakistan,
at the relevant time and others whom we considered likely to have relevant
knowledge. Statements were also sent from members of armed forces, civil
services and the police services involved and we then proceeded after
scrutiny of these statements to summon the witnesses. We recorded evidence
of as many as 72 persons and these included particularly Lt. Gen. A.A.K.
Niazi, Commander Eastern Command, Major Generals Farman Ali, Jamshed and
Maj. Gen. Rahim was reexamined.
Chapter
I
THE MORAL ASPECT
After analysing the evidence brought before
the Commission, we came to the conclusion that the process of moral degeneration
among the senior ranks of the Armed Forces was set in motion by their
involvement in Martial Law duties in 1958, that these tendencies reappeared
and were, in fact, intensified when Martial Law was imposed in the country
once again in March 1969 by General Yahya Khan, and that there was indeed
substance in the allegations that a considerable number of senior Army
Officers had not only indulged in large scale acquisition of lands and
houses and other commercial activities, but had also adopted highly immoral
and licentious ways of life which seriously affected their professional
capabilities and their qualities of leadership.
The civil administration in EastPakistan practically
came to a standstill, and the burden of running the Province fell
heavily upon the Army Officers. Their involvement in civil administration
continued unabated even after the induction of a sizable number of senior
civil servants from West Pakistan, including the Chief Secretary, the
Inspector General of Police and at least two Division Commissioners. According
to the Inspector General of Police, Mr. M.A.K Chaudhry (Witness No. 219),
"after the disturbances of March-April 1971, there was a parallel
Martial Law administration at all levels.
All wings of administration, relating to law
and order were under the control of Martial Law Authorities. A West Pakistan
Deputy Inspector General of Police in the field was not permitted by the
local Martial Law Authorities to come to the Provincial Headquarters"
for a conference with the Inspector General of Police. The observations
made in this behalf by Maj Gen. Rao Farman Ali, are worth quoting:
"A fully civil government could not be formed in East Pakistan as
had been announced by the ex-President. Dr. Malik an old man and politician,
had a weak personality. He could not annoy, the Martial Law Administrator
(Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi) also because of the unsettled conditions obtaining
in the Wing. Gen Niazi, on the other hand, cherished and liked power,
but did not have the breadth of vision or ability to understand political
implications. He did not display much respect for the civilian Governor.
According to Rear Admiral M. Sharif (Witness
No. 283) who was the Flag Officer Commanding the Pakistan Navy in
East Pakistan, "the foundation of this defeat was laid way back in
1958 when the Armed Forces took over the country ...". While learning
the art of politics in this newly assigned role to themselves, they gradually
abandoned their primary function of the art of soldiering, they also started
amassing wealth and usurping status for themselves."
Living off the Land
There is evidence to the effect that civilian shops and stores were broken
into by the troops without preparing any record of what was taken and
from where. This appears to us to be the genesis of the looting alleged
to have been indulged in by the Army in East Pakistan. Lt. Gen Niazi,
remarks [were] quoted by us in an earlier chapter, viz: "what have
I been hearing about shortage of rations? Are not there any cows and goats
in this country? This is enemy territory. Get what you want. This is what
we used to do in Burma." (vide Maj Gen Farman Ali's Evidence).
Glaring Cases of Moral Lapses Amongst
Officers Posted in East Pakistan
(1) Lt. Gen A.A.K. Niazi
From the mass of evidence coming before the Commission from witnesses,
both civil and military, there is little doubt that Gen. Niazi unfortunately
came to acquire a bad reputation in sex matters, and this reputation has
been consistent during his postings in Sialkot, Lahore and East Pakistan.
The allegations regarding his indulgence in the export of Pan by
using or abusing his position in the Eastern Command and as Zonal Martial
Law Administrator also prima facie appear to be well-founded, although
it was not our function to hold a detailed inquiry into the matter. It
is for the Government to decide whether these matters should also form
the subject of any inquiry or trial which may have to be ultimately held
against this officer.
2) Maj Gen Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC
36 (A)
Division, East Pakistan.Col. Bashir Ahmad Khan (Witness No. 263) who was
posted as DDML, Eastern Command, stated before the Commission that the
wife of Maj Gen Jamshed Khan had brought some currency with her while
being evacuated from Dacca on the morning of 16th of December 1971. He
further alleged that Lt. Col Rashid, Col. Staff o the East Pakistan Civil
Armed Forces, commanded by Maj Gen Jamshed Khan, was also reported to
have been involved in the mis-appropriation of currency
(3) Brig Jehanzeb Arbab, former Commander 57
Brigade.
(4) Lt. Col. (Now Brig) Muzaffar Ali Khan Zahid, former CO 31 field Regiment.
(5) Lt. Col. Basharat Ahmad, former CO 18 Punjab
(6) Lt. Col. Mohammad Taj, CO 32 Punjab
(7) Lt. Col Mohammad Tufail, Col 55 Field Regiment
(8) Major Madad Hussain Shah, 18 Punjab The evidence of Maj Gen Nazar
Hussain Shah (Witness No. 242 GOC 16 Div, Maj Gen M.H Ansari (Witness
NO. 233) GOC, 9 Div, as well as of Brig Baqir Siddiqui (Witness No. 218)
Chief of Staff, Eastern Command, disclosed that these officers and their
units were involved in large scale looting, including the theft of Rs.
1,35,00,000 from the National Bank Treasury at Siraj Gaj. We were informed
that a Court o Inquiry was convened under the Chairmanship of Maj Gen
M.H Ansari who could not complete the inquiry owing to the outbreak
of war. The GHQ representative was not able to inform us as to what action
had ultimately been taken by GIIQ in respect of these officers, except
that Brig Jehanzeb Arabab had been appointed to officiate as GOC of a
Division. The Commission feels that this appointment, before the completion
of the inquiry and exoneration of the officer from any blame, was highly
inadvisable on the part of the GHQ. We recommend that action should now
be taken without delay to finalise the proceedings of the inquiry commenced
by Maj Gen Ansari in East Pakistan.
Chapter II
ALLEGED ATROCITIES BY THE PAKISTAN ARMY
Let it not be forgotten that the initiative
in resorting to violence and cruelty was taken by the militants of the
Awami League, during the month of March, 1971, following General Yahya
Khan's announcement of the Ist of March regarding the postponement of
the session of the National Assembly scheduled for the 3rd of March 1971.
Harrowing tales of these atrocities were narrated by the large number
of West Pakistanis and Biharis who were able to escape from these places
and reach the safety of West Pakistan. The crimes committed by the AwamiLeague
miscreants were bound to arouse anger and bitterness inthe minds of the
troops.
Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, apparently in an endeavour
to put the blame on his predecessor, then Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan, stated
that damage done during those early earned for the military leaders names
such as "Changez Khan" and"Butcher of East Pakistan."
He went on to add: "on the assumption of command I was very much
concerned with the discipline of troops, and on 15th of April, 1971, that
is within four days of my command, I addressed a letter to all formations
located in the area and insisted that loot, rape, arson, killing of people
at random must stop. I had come to know that looted material had been
sent to West Pakistan which included cars, refrigerators and air conditioners
etc." Another significant statement was made in this regard
by Maj. Gen. Rao Barman Ali, Adviser to the Governor of East Pakistan
namely: "Harrowing tales of rape, loot, arson, harassment, and of
insulting and degrading behaviour were narrated in general terms.... I
wrote out an instruction to act as a guide for decent behaviour and recommended
action required to be taken to win over the hearts of the people. This
instruction under General Tikka Khan's signature was sent to Eastern Command.
I found that General Tikka's position was also deliberately undermined
and his instructions ignored...excesses were explained away by false and
concocted stories and figures." Indiscriminate killing and looting
could only serve the cause of the enemies of Pakistan. In the harshness,
we lost the support of the silent majority of the people of East Pakistan....
The Comilla Cantt massacre (on 27th/28th of March, 1971) under the orders
of CO 53 Field Regiment, Lt. Gen. Yakub Malik, in which 17 Bengali Officers
and 915 men were just slain by a flick of one Officer's fingers
should suffice as an example. There was a general feeling of hatred against
Bengalis amongst the soldiers and officers including Generals. There were
verbal instructions to eliminate Hindus.
Question of Responsibility
For almost three years now, the world has repeatedly
heard a list of 195 names said to have been prepared by the Dacca authorities
in connection with the commission of these atrocities and crimes. As the
Commission has not been supplied with a copy of this list, it is not possible
for us to comment upon the justification or otherwise of the inclusion
of any particular names therein. The falsity of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's
repeated allegation that Pakistani troops had raped 200,000 Bengali girls
in 1971 was borne out when the abortion team he had commissioned from
Britain in early 1972 found that its workload involved the termination
of only a hundred or more pregnancies.
Chapter
III
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CERTAIN
SENIOR ARMY COMMANDERS
There, however, still remains the question
of determining whether any disciplinary action is called for against certain
senior army commanders for their failings in the discharge of their professional
duties in the conduct ad prosecution of the war in East Pakistan.
Nature of Disciplinary Action
We find that there are several provisions in
the Pakistan Army Act 1952 having a direct bearing on this matter. In
the first place, there is section 24 which is in the following terms:-
"24. Offences in relation to enemy and punishable with death.
Section 25 is also relevant [i.e.] Offences in relation to the enemy and
not punishable with death. Finally, there is section 55 which is of a
general nature, and provides;- "55. Violation of good order and discipline-Any
person subject to this Act who is guilty of any act, conduct, disorder
and of military discipline shall , on conviction by court martial, be
punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to five
years, or with such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned".
Need and Justification for Trial and
Punishment
The Commission feels that there is consensus
on the imperative need to book these senior army commanders who have brought
disgrace and defeat to Pakistan. We believe that such action would not
only satisfy the nations demand for punishment where it is deserved, but
would also serve to emphasise the concept of professional accountability
which appears to have been forgotten by senior army officers since their
involvement in politics, civil administration and Martial Law duties.
Cases Requiring Action by Way of Court Martial
8. Judged in the light of this analysis of the events leading to the surrender
of our surrender of our Army in East Pakistan, and the relevant provisions
of the Pakistan Army Act and the considerations thereto, as outlined in
the preceding paragraphs, we are of the considered opinion that the following
senior officers ought to be tried by court martial on the charges listed
against them , and we recommend accordingly.
(1) Lt Gen A.A.K. Niazi, Commander, Eastern
Command
(i) That he wilfully failed to appreciate the
imminence of all-out war with India.
(ii) That he displayed utter lack of professional
competence, initiative and foresight, expected of an Army .
(xiii) That he was guilty of conduct unbecoming
a Officer and Commander of his rank and seniority in that he acquired
a notorious reputation for sexual immorality and indulgence in the smuggling
of Pan from East to West Pakistan;
(xv) That, on repatriation to Pakistan, he
deliberately adopted a false and dishonest stand to the effect that he
was willing and able to fight but was ordered to surrender by General
Yahya Khan, and that as a dutiful soldier he had no option but to obey
the said order against his best judgement.
(xvi) It has come to the notice of the Commission
that during his period of captivity, and even after repatriation to Pakistan,
Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi assisted by his Chief of Staff, Brig. Baqir Siddiqui,
has been makign efforts to influence his Divisional and Brigade Commanders,
by threats and inducements, so as to persuade them to present a coorinated
story of the events in East Pakistan with a view to mitigating his own
responsibility for the debacle 2. Maj Gen Mohammad Jamshed, ex-JOC 36
(ad hoc) Division, Dacca
(i) That having been appointed as GOC 36 (ad
hoc) Division for the express purpose of taking over from 14 Div., major
responsibility for the defence of Dacca, he wilfully failed to plan for
the same.
(iv) That he showed complete lack of courage and will to fight in that
he acquiesced in the decision of the Commander, Eastern Command, to surrender.
(3) Maj Gen M. Rahim Khan, ex-GOC 3. We had
occasion to comment upon the conduct of Maj GenRahim Khan,
who abandoned his Division and evacuated his Divisional HQ from Chandpur
, with no replacement, and with the consequence that his Division disintegrated.
In the light of the information now available we now consider that he
should be tried by a court martial on the following charges:
(i) That he shameful cowardice and undue regard
for his personal safety in seeking, and obtaining, permission from the
Eastern Command to abandon his Division and vacate his Divisional Headquarters
from Chandpur on the 8th of December 1971, simply because Chandpur was
threatened by the enemy, with the result that he deserted his troops and
his area of responsibility in the middle of the war with India;
(ii) That his wilful insistence on moving by
day against competent advise, owing to fear of Mukti Bahini, caused the
death of fourteen Naval ratings and four officers of his own HQ, besides
injuries to several others, and to himself due to strafing by Indian aircraft;
(iii) That in his anxiety to get away from
Chandpur, he wilfully abandoned valuable signal equipment with the result
that the communication system of the Division disintegrated and his subordinate
commanders and troops were left to their own fate;
(iv) That he on the 12th of December, 1971,
by word of mouth,,, caused alarm and despondency that "it is all
over , let us call it a day"' and that the Mukti Bahini might resort
to massacre'
(v) That he wilfully avoided submitting a debriefing
report to GHQ, on being specially evacuated to Pakistan in early 1971,
so as to conceal the circumstances of his desertion from his Div HQ at
Chandpur with the consequence that the authorities were persuaded to appoint
hi as Chief of the General Staff without any knowledge of his performance
in East Pakistan.
4. Brig. G.M. Baqir Siddiqui, former COS, Eastern
Command, Dacca
(i) That he wilfully collaborated with, and assisted, the Commander, Eastern
Command, in sending unduly pessimistic and alarming reports and signals
to GHQ with a view to elicit permission to surrender, as he had also lost
the will to fight owing to his culpable negligence and failure in the
performance of his professional duties as the Chief of Staff of the Eastern
Command;
(vi) That he wilfully, and for motives and
reasons difficult to understand and appreciate stopped the implementation
of denial plans with the result that large quantities of valuable war
materials were handed over intact to the Indian forces after the surrender,
in spite of the fact the GHQ had specifically ordered by their of the
10th December 1971 to carry out denial plans;
(ix)That he was unduly friendly with the enemy
during the period of his captivity, so much so that he was allowed to
go out shopping in Calcutta, a facility not allowed to anyone else by
the Indians;
5. Brig Mohammad Hayat, former Comd. 107 bde.
(9 Div)
(iii) That on a report that enemy tanks had broken through the defences
of Jessore he, without even verifying the same, shamefully abandoned the
fortress of Jessore without a fight on the 6th of December 1971, delivering
intact to the enemy all supplies and ammunition dumps stocked in the fortress,
and without issuing any orders to his unit in contact with the enemy,
who had to fight their own way during the following night.
(iv) That after abandoning Jessore without
contact with the enemy, he withdrew to khulna in wilful and intentional
violation of the clear orders of G.Q.C. 9 Division to withdraw to Magura
in the event of a forced withdrawal fro jessore, thus making it impossible
for the Divisional Commander to give battle to the enemy across the Madhumati
River.
6. Brig. Mohammad Asla Niazi, former Cod.,
53 Bde (39Ad hoc Div.)
(iii) That he shamefully abandoned the Fortress
of Laksham on or about the 9th of December 1971, which it was his duty
to defend;
(v) That he wilfully acted in callous disregard
of military ethics in abandoning at Laksha 124 sick and wounded with two
Medical Officers who were deliberately not informed about the proposed
vacation of the fortress; and
(vi) That while vacating the fortress of laksha
he wilfully and intentionally abandoned all heavy weapons, stocks of ammunition
and supplies for the use of the enemy, without implementing the denial
plan;
Before we conclude this part of the discussion,
we would like to place on record that, apart from a few individuals, the
large body of Officers and men operating in East Pakistan accepted the
final decision without any thought of disobedience only owing to their
ingrained sense of discipline, and the majority of them would have been
undoubtedly willing to fight to the last and lay down their lives for
the glory of Pakistan. The gallantry and determination with which some
of the battles were fought in East Pakistan has been acknowledged even
by the enemy.
Chapter
IV
CONCLUSIONS
Even more painful than the military failures
of lt. Gen Niazi is the story of the abjeet manner in which he agreed to
sign the surrender document laying down arms to the so-called joint-command
of India and Mukti Bahini, to be present at the Airport to receive the
victorious Indian General Aurora, to present a guard of honour to the
Indian General, and then to participate in the public surrender ceremony
at the Race Course, to the everlasting shame of Pakistan and its Armed
forces. Even if he had been obliged to surrender, by force of circumstances,
it was not necessary for him to behave in this shameful manner at every
step of the process of surrender. the detailed accounts which have been
given before the commission by those who had the misfortune of witnessing
these events, leave no doubt that Lt. Gen Nizai had suffered a complete
moral collapse during the closing phases of the war While undoubtedly
the responsibility for these failures lies with the Commander, Eastern
Command, GHQ cannot escape its responsibility, as the plan had been approved
by it. It was also the responsibility of GHQ to correct the mistakes of
the Eastern Command, as communications were open to the last. It was incumbent
upon GHQ to guide, direct and influence the conduct of the war in the
Eastern Theatre, if the Commander himself in that Theatre was incapable
of doing so. But the GHQ failed in this important duty. The Commander-in-Chief
remained indifferent.
Chapter
V
RECOMMENDATIONS
(i) That General Yahya Kina, General Abdul
Hamid Khan, Lt. Gen. S.G.M.M. Pirzada, Lt. Gen. Gul Hasan, Maj. Gen. Umar
and Maj Gen Mitha should be publicly tried for being party to a criminal
conspiracy to illegally usurp power from F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan in power
if necessary by the use of force. In furtherance of their common purpose
they did actually try to influence political parties by threats, inducements
and even bribes to support their designs both for bringing about a particular
kind of result during the elections of 1970, and later persuading some
of the political parties and the elected members of the National Assembly
to refuse to attend the session of the National Assembly scheduled to
be held at Dacca on the 3rd of March, 1971. They, furthermore, in agreement
with each other brought about a situation in East Pakistan which led to
a civil disobedience movement, armed revolt by the Awami League and subsequently
tot he surrender of our troops in East Pakistan and the dismemberment
of Pakistan:
(ii) That the Officers mentioned in No. (i)
above should also be tried for criminal neglect of duty in the conduct
of war both in East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The details of this neglect
would be found in the Chapters dealing with the military aspect of the
war
(iii) That Lt. Gen. Irshad Ahmad Khan, former
Commander 1 Corps, be tried for criminal and wilful neglect of duty in
conducting the operations of his Corps in such a manner that nearly 500
villages of the Shakargarh tehsil of Sialkot district in West Pakistan
were surrendered to the enemy without a light and as a consequence the
Army offensive in the south was seriously jeopardised;
(iv) That Maj Gen Abid Zahid, former GOC 15
Div, be tried for wilful neglect of duty and shameful surrender of a large
area comprising nearly 98 villages in the phuklian salient in the Sialkot
district of West Pakistan, which surrender also posed a standing threat
to the safety of Marala Headworks by bringing the Indian forces within
nearly 1500 yards thereof. He also kept the GHQ in the dark about Indian
occupation of the Phuklian salient until the loss was discovered after
the war.
(v) That Maj. Gen B.M. Mustafa, former GOC
18 Division, be tried for wilful neglect of duty in that his offensive
plan aimed at the capture of the Indian position of Ramgarh in the Rajasthan
area (Western Front) was militarily unsound and haphazardly planned, and
its execution resulted in severe loss of vehicles and equipment in the
desert.
(vi) That Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, former Commander,
Eastern Command, be court-martialled on 15 charges as set out in Chapter
III of part V of the Supplementary Report regarding his wilful neglect
in the performance of his professional and military duties connected with
the defence of East Pakistan and the shameful surrender of his forces
tot he Indians at a juncture when he still had the capability and resources
to offer resistance.
(vii) That Maj Gen Mohammad Jamshed, former
GOC 36 (ad-hoc) Division, Dacca, be tried by court martial on five charges
listed against him, in the aforementioned part of the report. Supplementary
Report, for wilful neglect of his duty in the preparation of plans for
the defence of Dacca and showing complete Jack of courage and will to
fight, in acquiescing in the decision of the Commander, Eastern Command,
to surrender to the Indian forces when it was still possible to put up
resistance for a period of two weeks or so, and also for wilfully neglecting
to inform the authorities concerned, on repatriation to Pakistan, about
the fact of distribution of Rs.50,000 by him out of Pakistan currency
notes and to her funds at his disposal or under his control in East Pakistan.
