Sunday 17 February 2013

Scope of Article 199 Writ Petition


PLJ 2012 Quetta 158 (DB)
Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar and Ghulam Mustafa Mengal, JJ.
M/s. AL-MAKKAH CNG STATION through its Proprietor--Petitioner
versus
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM OF NATURAL RESOURCES through its Secretary, Islamabad and another--Respondents
C.P. No. (s)51 of 2011, decided on 18.8.2011.
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Arts. 18 & 199--Compressed Natural Gas CNG (Production and Marketing) Rules, 1992--Scope--Directives of prime minister--Moratorium on new Gas Connections--OG RA refused to grant CNG production and marketing license in view of moratorium imposed by P.M--Challenge to--After obtaining NOC, approached (SSGC) for supply of gas--Petitioner does not fall within purview of moratorium and ban only applies to New Industrial connections--Vested right for grant of license--When pre-commissioning inspection had already been made by third party--Validity--After grant of provisional licences it is fundamental right of petitioner to conduct lawful business of CNG Station, as enshrined in Art. 18 of Constitution, which right of petitioner had, admittedly been infringed, as he had been prevented from utilizing and functioning CNG filing station subject to arbitrary and capricious action by public functionary in contravention of Ordinance/Rules--Right was not an absolute right and state may be law regulate trade, commerce or industry in interest of general public or free competition, but such prohibition can still be examined by superior Courts in exercise of powers of judicial review, on touchstone of fundamental rights--High Court directed to issue marketing licence to petitioner, as his case did not fall within domain of moratorium imposed by prime minister--Petition was allowed.           [Pp. 162 & 163] A & E
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Arts. 4 & 199--Constitutional Petition--Trade or business is lawful right--Moratorium on new gas connections--Prime Minister directive--Refusal to grant CNG production and marketing license--Challenge to--So long a trade or business in lawful, a citizen, who was eligible to conduct same, cannot be deprived from undertaking same--It is also fundamental right of every citizen u/Art. 4 of Constitution "to be dealt within accordance with law" and safe guards any action, detrimental to a person's property taken except in accordance with law.         [P. 162] B
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 199(1)(a)(1) & (ii)--Appropriate declaration can be made and directions issued--Moratorium of new gas connection--Prime Minister directive--Refusal of grant CNG production and marketing license--Challenge to--Objection regarding jurisdiction of High Court--Validity--Where a statutory functionary acts mala fide or in partial, unjust and oppressive manner, ample powers vest in High Court to issue appropriate direction under Art. 199 of Constitution.  [P. 163] D
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 158--Federal Cabinet in its policy decision had provided that supply of gas shall remain uninterrupted in area producing gas--Moratorium on new gas connections--Prime Minister directive--Challenge to--Prove in which a well-head of natural gas is situated shall have precedence over part of Pakistan in meeting the requirements from well-head subject to commitments and obligations as on commencing day--Neither any agreement regarding commitment had been placed on record, nor it was case of Govt. that gas produced in province was more than its requirements.        [Pp. 162 & 163] C
Mr. H. Shakeel Ahmed, Advocate for Petitioner.
Malik Sikandar Khan, D.A.G. for Respondent No. 1.
Mr. Saleem Ahmed Lashasri, Advocate for Respondent No. 2.
Date of hearing: 11.8.2011.
Judgment
Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, J.--Through this petition, the petitioner Abdul Jabbar Lakhti has assailed the directives, contained in letters dated 18th and 23rd April, 2011, issued by Respondent No. 1, pursuant to the directives of the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The petitioner has requested for the issuance of an appropriate writ, directing the respondents to issue marketing license to him without any fail.
2.  The petitioner, for establishment of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) Filling Station on property bearing Khasra No. 1200, situated, at National Highway district Sibi, applied to Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (hereinafter referred to as the "OGRA") for grant of a license under the provisions of the Compressed Natural Gas CNG (Production and Marketing) Rules, 1992 (the Rules) and a provisional license was granted to him on 10th September, 2010, which was, subsequently, extended for a further period of two years. The petitioner in pursuance of said license, after obtaining No Objection Certificate (NOC) from Municipal Administration and license under the provisions of the Petroleum Act, 1934 (the Act) from the Chief Inspector of Explosives, approached the Sui Southern Gas Company (SSGC) for supply of gas, who agreed to supply the same. The petitioner, after obtaining license issued under the provisions of the Minerals Gas Safety Rules, 2010 and pre-commissioning inspection of the CNG Station by M/s IMTECH (Pvt.) Ltd, deposited Rs.22,51,038/- and Rs.490,000/- towards the dues of the SSGC and completed the CNG Station in all respects by spending more than forty million. However, Respondent No. 2 i.e. OGRA refused to grant CNG Production and Marketing License in view of the moratorium, imposed by the Prime. Minister of Pakistan, on the provision of all new gas connection across the country for a period of six months through the directives contained in letters dated 18th and 23rd April, 2011, referred to above.
3.  The respondents filed their separate par a-wise comments and the fact of issuance of the provisional license in favour of the petitioner was not denied, however, the issuance of moratorium was justified and it was stated that the moratorium was issued on account of large gap between demand and supply of gas and the said moratorium was "in accordance with the Oil and Gas Regulatory Ordinance, 2002".
4.  Mr. H. Shakil Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner, assailed the moratorium, including letters dated 18th and 23rd April, 2011, inter alia, on the following grounds:
(a)        the directives, contained in the letters dated 18th and 23rd April, 2011, issued by Respondent No. 1 pursuant to directives of the Prime Minister, are un-constitutional, illegal, void and in exercise of jurisdiction, not vested in them,
(b)        the aforesaid moratorium only applies to the new industrial connections, whereas the petitioner has been granted permission much before the imposition of ban,
(c)        the respondents, while refusing the grant of license and supply of gas, are acting in a manner, which apparently, violates Articles 4, 18 and 158 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the Constitution),
(d)        the petitioner made huge investments, as detailed in the petition, amounting to rupees 40 million.
5.  Malik Sikandar Khan, learned Deputy Attorney General, opposed filing of the petition, with the contention that the moratorium was rightly issued by the Prime Minister of Pakistan and genuine reason behind the same was a gap between the demand and supply. He further contended that the matter mainly relates to Respondent No. 2, being the Regulatory/Licensing Authority, as such, he prayed for excluding Respondent No. 1 from the array of respondents.
6.  Mr. Saleem Ahmed Lashari, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2, while supporting claim of the petitioner, requested for remand of the case to OGRA for decision.
7.  We have gone through the record carefully and considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties.
8.  Before we discuss the arguments addressed at the bar, it would be advantageous to reproduce the impugned letter dated 18th April, 2011, which speaks as under:
"MORATORIUM ON NEW GAS CONNECTIONS-PRIME MINISTER DIRECTIVE.
The Prime Minister has been pleased to direct that a moratorium be imposed on provision of all new gas connections across the country with immediate effect for a period of six (6) months.
Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Resources should take further necessary action accordingly to implement the Prime Minister's directive and intimate progress to this Secretariat at the earliest."
A plain reading of the above contents of letter dated 18th April, 2011 clearly demonstrates that case of the petitioner does not fall within the purview of aforesaid moratorium and the ban only applies to the New Industrial  Connections',  whereas   the   petitioner    had   been   granted permission by the SSGC much before the imposition of ban against the terms, and conditions, contained in letter dated 3rd September, 2009 after receiving a substantial amount for providing the connections as well as natural gas. The petitioner has made huge investments and has obtained permission and NOCs from various authorities, pursuant to the provisional license issued to him and has also deposited the dues of the SSGC, therefore, he has a vested right for the grant of the license, particularly when the pre-commissioning inspection has already been made by the third party i.e. consultants of OGRA. In such peculiar circumstances of the case, Respondent No. 2 is under legal obligation to issue the necessary permission/license for putting the petitioner's CNG Filling Station into operation.
9.  We are of the considered, view that, after grant of provisional license, it is the fundamental right of the petitioner to conduct the lawful business of CNG Filling Station, as enshrined in Article 18 of the Constitution, which right of the petitioner has, admittedly, been infringed, as he has been prevented from utilizing and functioning the CNG filling station in view of the provisional license issued to him by the Respondent No. 2 and is subjected to arbitrary and capricious action by the public functionary in contravention of the Ordinance/Rules. We are not unmindful of the fact that this right is not an absolute right and the State may by law regulate the Trade, Commerce or Industry in the interest of general public or free competition, but such prohibition can still be examined by the superior Courts in exercise of the powers of the judicial review, on the touchstone of other fundamental rights. Needless to mention here that so long a trade or business is lawful, a citizen, who is eligible to conduct the same, cannot be deprived from undertaking the same. It is also the fundamental right of every citizen under Article 4 of the Constitution "to be dealt with in accordance with law" and safeguards any action, detrimental to a person's property taken except in accordance with law. The respondents have not dealt with the petitioner in accordance with law i.e. the Rules and have illegally refused the issuance of marketing license. Accordingly, appropriate declaration can be made and directions issued respectively pursuant to sub-paragraph (ii) (i) and of paragraph (a) to sub-Article (1) of Article 199 of the Constitution.
10.  We are in agreement with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Respondent No. 2 has fallen in error while refusing grant of marketing license to the petitioner. The Federal Cabinet in its policy decision has provided that supply of gas shall remain uninterrupted in the areas producing, gas, including the Province of Balochistan.  It  is  provided  under  Article 158 of the Constitution that a Province, in which a well-head of natural gas is situated, shall have precedence over other part of Pakistan in meeting the requirements from the well-head, subject to the commitments and obligations as on the commencing day. Admittedly, neither any agreement regarding commitment has been placed on record, nor it is the case of respondents that the gas produced in the Province is more than its requirements.
11.  Coming to the objection of the learned Deputy Attorney General Malik Sikandar Khan regarding the jurisdiction of this Court, we are of the confident view that where a statutory functionary acts mala fide or in partial, unjust and oppressive manner, ample powers vest in the High Court to issue appropriate directions under Article 199 of the Constitution. We are fortified our this view from the case of Brig. Muhammad Bashir vs. Abdul Karim and others reported in PLD 2004 Supreme Court 271, relevant portion whereof speaks as under:
"It is well settled by now that "Article 199 casts an obligation on the High Court to act in aid of law, protect the rights of the citizens within the framework of the constitution against the infringement of law and Constitution by the executive authorities, strike a rational compromise and a fair balance between the rights of the citizens and the actions of the State functionaries, claimed to be in the larger interest of Society. This power is conferred on the High Court under the Constitution and is to be exercised subject to Constitutional limitations. The Article is intended to enable the High Court to control executive action so as to bring it in conformity^' with the law. Whenever the executive acts in violation of the law, an appropriate order can be granted which will relieve the citizen of the effects of illegal action. It is an omnibus Article under which relief can be granted to the citizens of the country against infringement of any provision of law or of the Constitution. If the citizens of this country are deprived of the guarantee given to them under the Constitution, illegally or, not in accordance with law, then Article 199 can always be invoked for redress."
12.  In view of the reasons stated above, we hereby direct the Respondent No. 2 to immediately issue marketing license to the petitioner, as his case does not fall within the domain of Moratorium imposed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan.
The petition is allowed on the aforesaid terms with special cost of Rs.20,000/- (rupees twenty thousand only), which are to be borne by the Respondent No. 2.
(R.A.)  Petition allowed

Judgment on CNG Prices


PLJ 2010 Tax Cases (Lah.) 23
Present: Sh. Azmat Saeed, J.
M/s GAS LINKS C.N.G. PVT. (LTD.) FAISALABAD through its Director and others--Petitioners
versus
FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Finance, Islamabad and others--Respondents
W.P. No. 3018 of 2009, decided on 6.11.2009.
Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990)--
----Ss. 71 & 3(1)--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Levy and collection of sales tax--Liability of--Business of running CNG stations--Special procedure had been formulated pertaining to collection and payment of on natural gas and electric power, called Special Procedure Rules, 2007--Common questions of law and facts--Petitioners not only have a connection for supply of natural gas, but also consume electric power supplied by distributions companies--Tax on supply of electric power is unreasonable and arbitrary and in violation of fundamental rights of the petitioners--Validity--Neither vires of Sales Tax Act, 1990 nor any provision had been challenged--Petitioners had challenged the levy and collection of sales tax on electric power supplied to CNG station by distribution companies inter alia on the ground that sales tax on supply of natural gas constitutes a final discharge of liability of CNG station under Sales Tax Act, and therefore, the levy and collection of sales tax on the bill for electric power consumed by CNG stations amount to double taxation--It is not disputed between parties--Federal Government in view of Section 71 of the Sales Tax Act, is vested the authority and jurisdiction to prescribe a special procedure--Petitions were dismissed.      [Pp. 27 & 28] A & B
Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990)--
----S. 7-A--Levy of sales tax of 9%--Supply of natural gas by transmission and distribution companies to CNG stations--Collection of charge is ultra vires of Sales Tax Act--Question is levy of charge and collection of sales tax on electric power supply--Double taxation--Validity--Levy of sales tax of 9% in lieu of value addition is in consonance with Section 7-A of Sales Tax Act and power had been invoked while issuing notification while making Special Procedure Rules, 2007--Levy and collection of sales tax at rate of 9% has not been challenged through these writ petitions, nor it is the case of the petitioners that the charge is ultra vires of Sales Tax Act, otherwise illegal--Question is the levy of charge and collection of sales tax on electric power supply to the petitioners by distribution companies--Held: Levy of sales tax on electric power amounts to double taxation in view of levy of 9% tax on supply of natural gas in lieu of value addition by CNG station.    [Pp. 29 & 30] C & D
Sales Tax Special Procedures Rules, 1990--
----R. 20--Sales Tax Act, 1990, S. 7-A--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Business of running CNG stations--Special procedure has been formulated pertaining to collection and payment of on natural gas and electric power--Collection and payment of sales tax on electric power--Illegality in levy of collection of sales tax on electric power supplied to CNG stations--Entitlement of claim refund of input tax--Validity--Such levy is valid and 9% is being charged and collected on account of value addition by CNG stations--No tax is being charged or collected on the supplies made by CNG stations to their customers in lieu whereof 9% sales tax is charged and collected by gas transmission companies--Where the supplies are converted into another taxable supply, the same are liable to collection of sales tax--In such an eventuality, in order to avoid duplication of the tax burden upon the ultimate consumer, the sales tax already paid by recipient of supplies is liable to be adjusted against the sales tax payable on the converted further taxable supply.  [P. 30] E & D
PTCL 2002 Cl. 115, ref.
Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007--
----Chapter III--Collection and payment of sales tax on electric power--Providing of electric power to petitioners was an independent supply subject to levy and collection of sales tax--Validity--Charge and collection of sales tax on the supply of electric power is in consonance with letter, spirit, scheme and structure of Sales Tax Act, 1990--No law or the principle of law had been cited which is offended thereby--Petitioners are the ultimate consumers of electric power they must bear the incidence of sales tax.   [P. 30] G
Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 1990--
----Rs. 13 & 6--Sales Tax Act, 1990, Ss. 7, 8 & 8-B--Business of running CNG stations--Levy of collection of sales tax on electric power supplied to CNG stations--Whether the petitioners are entitled to claim refund of input tax--Premature and misconceived--Legality--Counsels for petitioners had been unable to point out any illegality in levy of collection of sales tax on electric power supplied to CNG stations--As to whether the petitioners are entitled to claim refund of input tax in respect thereto is a matter not only alien to lis at hand having not been specifically asserted, but also premature as no such claim for adjustment or refund of the tax has been made by petitioners and declined by the department--Petitions appears to be premature and misconceived and are accordingly dismissed with direction that if and when any claim for refund or adjustment of input tax is made by petitioner in terms of Rule 17 of Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 1990 an order was passed and petitioners might seek their remedy available under law.      [P. 31] H
Ch. Anwar-ul-Haq, Mr. Aamir Sohail, Mr. Khalid Nawaz Ghuman, Mr. Majid Saeed Butt, Rana Muhammad Afzal, Mr. Muhammad Saqib Sheikh, Mr. Bilal Ahmed Qazi, Syed Ali Imran Rizvi, Mr. Muhammad Nadeem Mirza, Mr. Muhammad Akram Nizami, Mr. Zehsan Amir, Mr. Ajmal Khan, Mr. Zulkernen Khan, Mr. Muhammad Saleem Ch., Ch. Liaqat Ali Sandhu, Rana Muhammad Abdul Qadoos, Mr. Abdul Qadoos Mugal, Mr. Muhammad Waseem Ch. and Mr. Sajjad Sarwar Saqib, Advocates for Petitioners.
Sh. Izhar-ul-Haq, Advocate, Ms. Kausar Perveen & Dr. Irteza Awan, Advocate for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 29.10.2009.
Judgment
Writ Petitions 12730-2009 KW CNG vs. Federation of Pakistan, 12729-2009 Al-Karam CNG vs. Federation of Pakistan, 2954-2009 National CNG Service vs. Federation of Pakistan, 6778-2009 Al-Jehad Filling Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 6775-2009 Al-Hasan CNG vs. Federation of Pakistan, 4775-2009 Khalid Petroleum vs. Federation of Pakistan, 4774-2009 New Zealand CNG Master (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Federation of Pakistan, 4772-2009 New Zealand CNG Master (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Federation of Pakistan, 4771-2009 Kashif CNG & Filling Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 16125-2009 Kashmir CNG Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 19676-2009 Talha Saad CNG vs. Federation of Pakistan, 9811-2009 Haidar Petroleum vs. Federation of Pakistan, 9810-2009 Brite Way CNG vs. Federation of Pakistan, 14686-2009 Huk Fuel I vs. Federation of Pakistan, 14575-2009 Shah Nawaz CNG Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 14589-2009 Din Petroleum Service vs. Federation of Pakistan, 12732-2009 Mehar Petroleum CNG vs. Federation of Pakistan, 12731-2009 Tri Star CNG vs. Federation of Pakistan, 3020-2009 Fuel Care CNG vs. Federation of Pakistan, 2956-2009 Sadiq & Sons Associate vs. Federation of Pakistan, 2955-2009 PSJ CNG Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 2953-2009 Mian Petroleum vs. Federation of Pakistan, 20527-2009 Khokhar Filling Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 2764-2009 Zaman Petroleum vs. Federation of Pakistan, 18438-2009 M/s. Khawaja CNG Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 17986-2009 M/s. KSK CNG vs. Federation of Pakistan, 17989-2009 M/s. Citi CNG Filling Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 17991-2009 Bismilla CNG Filling Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 17995-2009 M/s. Gasoline (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Federation of Pakistan, 17994-2009 M/s. Ravi Point Filling Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 18441-2009 M/s. Gazcon CNG Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 17985-2009 M/s. Gasline CNG Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 17997-2009 M/s. Ahmed CNG Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 20513-2009 M/s. CNG Master Pvt Ltd. vs. Federation of Pakistan, 20514-2009 M/s. Mango Garden CNG Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 20515-2009 M/s. Khan Filling Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 20514-2009 Thokar CNG Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 11081-2009 M/s. Gas Point CNG Station vs. Federal Board of Revenue etc., 10959-2009 M/s. Nawals CNG vs. Federal Board of Revenue etc., 9860-2009 M/s. Superstar CNG Station vs. Federal Board of Revenue etc., 6160-2009 M/s. Madina CNG Filling Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 1315-2009 Qadir CNG Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 14572-2009 Anmol CNG Filling Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 14565-2009 Almadina CNG Filling Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 14563-2009 National CNG Filling Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 14571-2009 Zia-e-Madina CNG Filling Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 9563-2009 Mian CNG Filling Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 1712-2009 Glaxy Filling Station vs. FBR, 13932-2009 Nur Sons CNG Filling vs. Federal Board of Revenue, 20743-2009 Mian Muhammad Amin vs. Federation of Pakistan, 2549-2009 Surriya Bibi C/O Prime CNG vs. Federal Board of Revenue, 19884-2009 M/s. Al-Bhai Petroleum Service vs. Federation of Pakistan, 7163-2009 Muhammad Aslam vs. Federation of Pakistan, 9571-2009 Amjad Hameed Sheikh vs. Federation of Pakistan, 9640-2009 Fakhar CNG Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 3473 of 2008 (BWP) Al-Mezan CNG Filling Station vs. DG Regional Income Tax Officer etc., 9499 of 2009 M/s. Millat Filling CNG Station vs. Federation of Pakistan etc., 10356-2009 Iqra Filling Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 17269-2008 M/s. Kare CNG Filling Station vs. Federal Board of Revenue etc., 9498-2009 M/s. Millat CNG Filling Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 20777-2009 Bismilla CNG Filling Station vs. Federation of Pakistan, 15396-2009 M/s. Alkausar Traders vs. Chairman Federal Board of Revenue and 7821-2009 M/s. Sunny Stars CNG Filling Station etc. vs. Federation of Pakistan filed by various petitioners involving common questions of law and facts are being disposed of through this order.
2.  Petitioners in the above captioned writ petitions claim to be duly registered under the Sales Tax Act 1990, and are engaged in the business of running CNG Stations and some of them also run petrol pump along with CNG stations. In the above context, the petitioners not only have a connection for the supply of Natural Gas, but also consume Electric Power supplied by various distributions companies who have also been impleaded as respondents in these petitions. It is the case of the petitioners that the Federal Government had issued a Notification dated 9.6.2007, whereby, in exercise of powers conferred inter alia under Section 71 of the Sales Act Tax 1990, a Special Procedure has been formulated pertaining to the collection and payment of on Natural Gas and Electric Power, called Special Procedure Rules 2007, and in terms of said special procedure rules, it is contended that for the supply of Natural Gas to CNG Station, Sales Tax at the rate of 25% of the value has been levied, out of which, 16% is chargeable on the supply by the gas transmission companies in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Sales Tax Act and a further 9% in lieu of value addition made by CNG Station.
3.  In the above perspective, the petitioners have challenged the levy and collection of the Sales Tax on the Electric Power supplied to CNG Station by the Distribution companies inter alia on the ground that the Sales Tax on supply of Natural Gas constitutes a final discharge of the liability of the CNG Station under the Sales Tax Act, and therefore, the levy and collection of Sales Tax on the bill for the Electric Power consumed by CNG Station amounts to double taxation. Great stress in this behalf was laid by the learned counsels for the petitioners that Sales Tax being charged and collected by the gas transmission company include 9% in lieu of value addition by the CNG Stations. It is next contended that the said tax on the supply of Electric Power is unreasonable and arbitrary and in violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioners.
4.  Learned counsels appearing on behalf of the Department have controverted the stance being taken on behalf of the petitioners by contending that 9% of the Sale Tax which has been levied on the supply of Natural Gas in lieu of value addition by CNG Station, and no further tax on the supply of Natural Gas by CNG Station to the consumer is being collected, hence, there is no question of double taxation. It is added that the supply of Electric Power is a separate and distinct taxable supply which is dealt with by the other provision of the Special Procedure Rules pertaining to the supply of Electric Power. Learned counsels have also placed on record, copy of the minutes of meeting dated 30.5.2007 held by the representative of the Department and All Pakistan CNG Association to contend that 9% tax has been levied in lieu of value addition with the consent of the members of the Association including the petitioners, who are therefore estopped from challenging the same through the above captioned writ petitions.
5.  In rebuttal, learned counsels representing the petitioners have urged at the bar that no doubt different provisions have been enacted in the Special Procedure Rules for the supply of the Electric Power, however, the Department is not permitting any adjustment or refund of input tax with regard to the Sales Tax charged on the Electric Power being supplied to the CNG Stations.
6.  In response, learned counsels for the Department have urged that these contentions were neither pleaded by the petitioners in these petitions nor have they claimed any refund or adjustment in this behalf from the department, hence, these contentions are alien to the lis and cannot be adjudicated upon by this Court while hearing the instant petitions.
7.  Heard. Record perused. At the very outset, it has been noticed that neither vires of the Sales Tax Act 1990 nor any provision thereof has been challenged. It is a matter of record that vide notification dated 9.6.2007, the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules 2007 have been made and enforced. It is not disputed between the parties that Federal Government in view of Section 71 of the Sales Tax Act is, vested with the authority and jurisdiction to prescribe a special procedure. It is not the case of the petitioners that said rules are ultra vires Section 71 ibid. The aforesaid Special Procedure Rules, inter alia, deal both with the Electric Power and the collection and payment of Sales Tax on Natural Gas. Latter is governed by Chapter IV of the Special Procedure Rules and the provision in this behalf applicable to the present petitioners are as follows:
CHAPTER IV
SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR COLLECTION AND PAYMENT OF SALES TAX ON NATURAL GAS
19.   Application:--The provision of this chapter shall apply for collection and payment of on Natural Gas including Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Imported, produced, transmitted and supplied by gas-well head companies and gas transmission and distribution companies licensed under the Natural Gas Rules, 1960, including their distributors, dealers, sales agents, retailers or by any other person hereinafter called the "person" for the purposes of this Chapter and dealing in importation, production or distribution and supply of Natural Gas including Compressed Natural Gas and Liquefied Petroleum Gas.
20.   Levy and collection of Sales Tax :--(1) Every person who supplies Natural Gas shall be liable to registration and shall charge and pay Sales Tax at the rate specified in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act.
(2)   Sales Tax on Natural Gas shall be levied and collection at the following stages and in the following manners, namely:--
(a)   .....................................................
(b)   .....................................................
(c)   In case of supply of Natural Gas by transmission and distribution company, the person responsible to charge, collect and deposit sales tax shall be the gas transmission and distribution company and the value for the purpose of tax shall be the total amount billed including price of Natural Gas, charges excluding the amount of late payment surcharge rents, commissions and all duties and tax, local Provincial and Federal, but excluding the amount of as provided in clause (46) of Section 2 of the Act:
      Provided that in case of supply of Natural Gas to CNG Stations the gas transmission and distribution company shall charge sales tax at the rate of twenty-five percent of the value as aforesaid. This rate shall include sixteen percent as chargeable on supplies of gas company under sub-section (1) of Section 3 and nine percent in lieu of value addition made by CNG Stations:
      Provided further that CNG Station, if not already registered, shall obtain registration under Chapter 1 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006, and shall also file quarterly return in the manner given in Rule 7; and].
8.  Rule 20(2)(c) reproduced above pertains particularly to the supply of Natural Gas by transmission and distribution companies to CNG Station, and the first proviso thereto prescribes Sales Tax at the rate of 25% of the value shall be charged which includes 16% is chargeable on the supply by gas transmission companies in terms of Section 3 sub-section (1) of the Sales Tax Act and 9% in lieu of value addition by the CNG Stations.
9.  Levy of Sales Tax of 9% in lieu of value addition is in consonance with Section 7A of the Sales Tax Act, and power thereunder have been invoked while issuing notification dated 9.6.2007 while making Special Procedure Rules 2007 as stated therein. Levy and collection of the aforesaid Sales Tax at the rate of 9% has not been challenged through these writ petitions, nor it is the case of the petitioners  that  said  charge  is  ultra  vires  of  Sales  Tax  Act,  1990  or otherwise illegal. In fact what has been called in question is the levy of charge and collection of Sales Tax on the Electric Power Supply to the petitioners by the Distribution Companies.
10.  It has been contended that levy of Sales Tax on Electric Power amounts to double taxation in view of the levy of 9% tax on the supply of Natural Gas in lieu of value addition by the CNG Station. Perusal of Rule 20 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 Special Procedure Rules and Section 7-A of the Act ibid makes it clear and obvious that such levy is valid and 9% is being charged and collected on account of value addition by CNG Stations. No tax is being charged or collected on the supplies made by CNG Stations to their customers in lieu whereof 9% Sales Tax is charged and collected by the gas transmission companies.
The contentions now being raised by the learned counsels for petitioners must necessarily be examined in the context of the scheme and structure of Sales Tax Act 1990 and the Rules framed thereunder. In pith and substance, Sales Tax is a tax on consumption charged upon a taxable supply collected by a registered person making the said supply as an agent and trustee of the Federal Government. Where such taxable supplies are consumed, the burden of tax falls upon the consumer. However, where the said supplies are converted into another taxable supply, the same are liable to collection of Sales Tax. However, in such an eventuality, in order to avoid duplication of the tax burden upon the ultimate consumer, the Sales Tax already paid by the recipient of the supplies is liable to be adjusted against the Sale Tax payable on the converted further taxable supply. I am fortified in this view by the dictum of law laid down by this Court in the case reported as PTCL 2002 CL 115 M/s. Mayfair Spinning Mills Ltd. Lahore vs. Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal Lahore and two others.
The collection and payment of Sales Tax on the Electric Power is also dealt with and covered by Sales Tax Special Procedure Rule 2007 Chapter III. The providing of Electric Power to the petitioners is an independent supply subject to levy and collection of Sales Tax. Viewed in the perspective of the law, it is clear and obvious that the charge and collection of Sales Tax on the supply of Electric Power is in consonance with the letter, spirit, scheme and structure of Sales Tax Act, 1990. No law or the principle of law has been cited which is offended thereby. To the extent that the petitioners are the ultimate consumers of Electric Power, they must bear the incidence of Sales Tax.
In fact the challenge thrown by the learned counsels for the petitioners in this respect is a little out of focus. The only matter that may arise would be as to whether the petitioners are entitled to claim the adjustment or refund of said tax levied and collected on the supply of Electric Power. Reference in this behalf is made to Rule 16 of the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules 1990 which reads as under:
CHAPTER III
SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR COLLECTION AND PAYMENT OF SALES TAX ON ELECTRIC POWER.
16.   Input tax adjustment for registered consumers:--(1) In case of registered consumers, the Electric Power bill issued by Electric Power distribution company shall be treated as a tax invoice as define in clause (4) of Section 2 of the Act.
(2)   The registered consumers shall be entitled to claim input tax adjustment against such invoice after the bill has been paid, as per the provisions of Sections 7, 8 and 8 B of the Act provided the bill contains registration number and address of the business premises declared to the Collector by such consumer.
11.  It is not the case of the petitioners that at any point of time any claim in terms of Rule 16 was ever made and has been declined. No such allegation or assertion has been made in any of the said petitions. Be that as it may, if and when any such application is made, the same will obviously be subject to the provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990 more particularly Sections 7, 8 and 8B thereof, as has been specifically mentioned in Rule 16, and in this behalf appropriate findings would also be required to be returned as to whether the Electric Power or any part thereof is used for the purpose of making a further taxable supply, if any, by the petitioners. Such exercise cannot be conducted by this Court, hence, this aspect of the matter cannot be adjudicated upon by this Court at this stage.
12.  For the foregoing facts and reasons, learned counsels for the petitioners have been unable to point out any illegality in the levy of collection of Sales Tax on the Electric Power supplied to CNG Stations. As to whether the petitioners are entitled to claim refund of input tax in respect thereto is a matter not only alien to the lis at hand having not been specifically asserted, but also premature as no such claim for adjustment or refund of the tax has been made by the petitioners and declined by the Department. Consequently, these petitions appear to be premature and misconceived and are accordingly dismissed with the direction that if and when any claim for refund or adjustment of input tax  is  made  by  the  petitioners  in  terms  of  Rule  13  of  the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules 1990 an order is passed thereon, and the petitioners may seek their remedy available under the law.
(R.A.)      Petition dismissed.

When a mother is disentitled for child custody?


PLJ 2008 Cr.C. (Lahore) 297
Present: Iqbal Hameed-ur-Rehman, J.
ABDUL WAHID--Petitioner
versus
Mst. ALIYA and 2 others--Respondents
Crl. Misc. No. 850-H of 2007, decided on 27.8.2007.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
----S. 491--Muhammadan Law--S. 354--Right of Hizanat--Recovery of minor aged 4 years and 6 months--Matter of custody of minors--Detenue was produced--Entitlement of minor--Matter qua guardianship and custody of minor was pending before competent Court of law--Validity--Female could only be disentitled to the custody of her minor child if she remarries or goes and resides at a distant place or if she leads an immoral life or she neglects to take proper care of the child--Held: None of disentitlements propounded in S. 354 of Muhammadan Law applies to mother--Detenue is of a very minor age--Being real mother is entitled to have the custody of her minor daughter as she has a preferential right of Hizanat over the child.  [P. 298] A & B
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
----S. 491--Custody of minors of tender age--Nature of habeas corpus--If custody of minors was improperly disturbed, then the real mother was entitled to have custody of her son who was below the age of seven years and daughters who had not attained puberty.  [P. 298] C
PLD 2004 SC 1, rel.
Habeas Corpus--
----Decision in habeas corpus matter could not be permitted to operate as res-judicata to any subsequent petition.    [P. 299] D
Mr. Tanveer Ahmad Hashmi, Advocate for Petitioner.
Rana Ameer Ahmad Khan, AAG for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 27.8.2007.
Order
Through this petition under Section 491 Cr.P.C., the petitioner seeks recovery of his minor daughter namely Amna aged 4 years and 6 months stated to be in the illegal and improper custody of Respondent No. 1 Mst. Aliya. The detenue has been produced by Respondent No. 1 as ordered. She has also produced a copy of the order dated 28.7.2007 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Gujranwala, whereby he disposed of the petition under Section 491 Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioner, holding that "since the matter regarding the guardianship and custody of minor is pending before Competent Court of law, therefore, I am not inclined to pass any order on this application". The said order has been passed on an earlier petition filed by the petitioner.
2.  Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the petitioner had delivered the minors to Respondent No. 1 Mst. Aliya on 10.6.2007 in pursuance of the order dated 6.6.2007 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Gujranwala, thereafter Respondent No. 1 handed back over the two minors to the petitioner apart from the detenue Mst. Amna Bibi, who was detained on the plea that minor was sleeping and the respondent asked the petitioner to take her back the next morning, as such the respondent has forcefully detained the minor and refused to restore the custody to the petitioner. It is further contended that earlier the petitioner had failed a petition under Section 491 Cr.P.C. for the recovery of minor Amna Bibi before the learned Sessions Judge Gujranwala, who vide order dated 28.7.2007 had declined to pass any order on his application and to restore the custody of the detenue to the petitioner, hence this petition has been filed.
3.  Arguments heard.
4.  The law is very much clear on the point and Section 354 of the Muhammadan Law states that a female could only be disentitled to the custody of her minor child if she remarries or goes and resides at a distant place or if she leads an immoral life or she neglects to take proper care of the child. In the instant case, none of the disentitlements propounded in Section 354 of the Muhammadan Law applies to Respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 had earlier filed an application seeking recovery of her minor children, which had been declined by the learned Sessions Judge, Gujranwala, vide his order dated 6.6.2007. Thereafter the respondent had moved an application before the Guardian Judge which is pending and the schedule of meeting has been given. The detenue is of a very minor age. The respondent being real mother is entitled to have the custody of her minor daughter as she has a preferential right of Hizanat over the child. In this respect reliance is placed upon Mussarat Waris vs. Muhammad Afsar Khan and 4 others, wherein it has been held that in matters pertaining to custody of minors of tender age, High Court was empowered to issue directions in the nature of  habeas corpus under Section 491 Cr.P.C. if custody of minors was improperly disturbed, then the real mother was entitled to have the custody of her son who was below the age of seven years and daughters who had not attained puberty". Reliance is also placed upon Mst. Khalida Parveen vs. Muhammad Sultan Mahmood and another (PLD 2004 SC 1), wherein it was held hat "Courts in the cases pertaining to the custody of a child were not supposed to go into the technicalities of the law and they should decide the case keeping in view mainly the welfare of the child" Reliance is also placed upon Mst. Razia Rehman vs. Station House Officer and others (PLD 2006 SC 533), wherein it was held that "Habeas Corpus Petition. Earlier decision in habeas corpus matter could not be permitted to operate as res-judicata with respondent to any such subsequent petition". Therefore, the earlier decision in the petition filed by the respondent could not operate as a res-judicata.
5.  In view of the above perspective and keeping in view the authorities referred above, the minor detenue Mst. Amna Bibi is allowed to be retained by Respondent No. 1 and order dated 6.6.2007 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Gujranwala is set aside. Resultantly, this petition is dismissed.
(R.A.)      Petition dismissed.

There is no appeal against the order of removal of guardianship


PLJ 2009 Sh.C. (AJ&K) 115
Present: Sardar M. Ashraf Khan, J.
UMAR MEHMOOD--Appellant
versus
ARSHAD MEHMOOD--Respondent
C.A. No. 58 of 2006, decided on 14.2.2009.
Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (VIII of 1890)--
----S. 47 & Scope of--Appealable order--Application for cancellation of guardianship certificate was disallowed--Appeal for reversal--Validity--Controversy between the parties--Suits pertaining to appointment of guardian of a minor of person and property of the minor are governed by Guardians and Wards Act--Held: Appeal against order for removal of guardian was permissible, while an order made by a Court of competent jurisdiction refusing to remove a guardian, as in instant case has not been made appealable--Appeal was dismissed.  [P. 117] A & G
Majority Act, 1875 (IX of 1875)--
----S. 4--Scope of--Minor means a person who under the provision of Majority Act, is to be deemed not to have attained his majority.
      [P. 117] B
Majority Act, 1875 (IX of 1875)--
----S. 3--Age of majority--Minor of whose person or property or both has been appointed by a competent Court, before the minor has attained the age of eighteen years, shall be deemed to have attained his age of majority, while every minor of whose property, the superintendence has been assumed by Court of wards before the minor has completed his age of twenty one years shall & treated as minor and not before.
      [P. 117] C
Age of Minor--
----The age of minor, whose guardian of person and property is appointed by Court shall be less than eighteen years but where the Court assumes the superintendence and control of the persons and property of a minor, the minor shall be deemed to have attained his majority when he shall have completed his age of 21 years.    [P. 117] D
Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (VIII of 1890)--
----Ss. 39 & 47--Removal of guardian--Application for cancellation guardian was rejected--Appellant has crossed the age of eighteen years and is also appointed by a Court of competent jurisdiction--Present appellant is ceased to be a minor, as such the appeal has become infructuous--Appellant has filed application for removal of the guardian u/S. 39 of Act, which was rejected--According to S. 47 of Act, an appeal is allowed in circumstances enumerated in the provision of law. [Pp. 117 & 118] E & F
Bostan Choudhry, Advocate for Appellant.
Mr. Muhammad Younis Arvi, Advocate for Respondent.
Date of hearing: 14.2.2009.
Order
The above titled appeal has been directed against the Order of Guardian Judge Mirpur dated 17.7.2006 whereby, the application of the appellant was disallowed by the said Court.
2.  The brief facts forming the background of the instant appeal are that the petitioner/appellant filed an application for cancellation of Guardianship certificate issued in favour of the respondent by the trial Court on 30.10.2005. The trial Court after due process of law, disallowed the same vide its order dated 17.7.2006. Hence this appeal for reversal of the same.
3.  Muhammad Younis Arvi, the learned Counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection and submitted that as the appellant Umer Mehmood has attained the age of 20 years, as such the present appeal filed by him as minor through his mother as next friend has become infructuous therefore, the same may be dismissed.
4.  Muhammad Bostan Choudhry, the learned Counsel for the appellant was confronted with the situation, he has frankly admitted that although appellant has crossed the age of 18 years, yet according to Majority Act 1875 (Act XI of 1875) the age of majority persons is 21 years, as such the minor appellant being below to the age of 21 years is competent to contest his suit through next friend. Therefore, the present appeal may be disposed of on merits.
5.  I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the relevant record with great care.
6.  To resolve the controversy between the parties, it will be relevant to mention here that suits pertaining to appointment of Guardian of a minor of person and property of the minor are governed by the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. Wherein the age of majority is defined in sub-section (1) of Section 4, which says that:--
"`minor' means a person who, under the provisions of the Majority Act, 1875 (IX of 1875), is to be deemed not to have attained his majority".
7.  According to Majority Act, 1875 (Act IX of 1875) minor means a person who under the provision of this act is to be deemed not to have attained his majority. Now the question is that what is the age of majority provided in the said Act. Section 3 of the Act contains that:--
"Every minor of whose person or property or both a guardian, other than a guardian for a suit within the meaning of Order XXXII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (Act V of 1908), has been or shall be appointed or declared by any Court of Justice before the minor has attained the age of eighteen years, and every minor of whose property the superintendence has been or shall be assumed by any Court of Wards before the minor has attained that age shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Succession Act, 1925 or in any other enactment, be deemed to have attained his majority when he shall have completed his age of twenty one years and not before."
8.  The plain reading of the above provision of law shows that a minor of whose person or property or both has been appointed by a competent Court, before the minor has attained the age of eighteen years, shall be deemed to have attained his age of majority, while every minor of whose property, the superintendence has been assumed by the Court of Wards before the minor has completed his age of twenty-one years shall be treated as minor and not before.
9.  Thus, it becomes abundantly clear that the age of the minor, whose guardian of person & property is appointed by the Court shall be less than eighteen years, but where the Court assumes the superintendence & control of the persons and property of a minor, the minor shall be deemed to have attained his majority, when he shall have completed his age of 21 years.
10.  In the present case, as it is admitted that appellant has crossed  the  age  of  eighteen  years  and  is also  appointed by a Court of competent jurisdiction therefore, the present appellant is ceased to be a minor, as such the appeal has become infructuous.
11.  It will not be out of place to mention here, that appellant has filed the application for removal of the guardian under Section 39 of Guardians and Wards Act, which was rejected through the impugned order dated 17.07.2006. According to section 47 of the above Act, an appeal is allowed only in circumstance enumerated in the said provision of law which are as under:--
"Orders appealable: An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order made by the Court:--
(a)   Under Section 7, appointing or declaring or refusing to appoint or declare a guardian; or
(b)   Under Section 9, sub-Section (3), returning an application; or
(c)   Under Section 25, making or refusing to make an order for the return of a ward to the custody of his guardian; or
(d)   Under Section 26, refusing leave for the removal of a ward from the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, or imposing conditions with respect thereto; or
(e)   Under Section 28, or Section 29, refusing permission to a guardian to do an act referred to in the Section; or
(f)   Under Section 32, defining, restricting or extending the powers of guardian; or
(g)   Under Section 39, removing a guardian; or
(h)   Under Section 40, refusing to discharge a guardian; or
(i)   Under Section 43, regulating the conduct or proceedings of a guardian or settling a matter in difference between joint guardian or enforcing the order; or
(j)   Under Section 44 or Section 45, imposing a penalty."
12.  It transpires from the perusal of the above provision of law that an appeal against order for removal of guardian is permissible, while an order made by a Court of competent jurisdiction refusing to remove a guardian, as in the present case has not been made appealable. Thus, in this view of the matter too, the present appeal is not competent which stands dismissed.
(R.A.)      Appeal dismissed

Kindnaping of Guardian


PLJ 2009 Cr.C. (Quetta) 531 (DB)
Present: Amanullah Khan Yasinzai, CJ. &
Akhtar Zaman Malghani, J.
Haji MUHAMMAD RAFIQ--Appellant
versus
TAWEEZ KHAN and others--Respondents
Crl. Acquittal Appeal No. 253 of 2007, decided on 25.11.2008.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
----S. 265-K--Pakistan Penal Code, (XLV of 1860) Ss. 147, 148, 149 & 365--Appeal against acquittal--Determination of age--NADRA record--Application regarding acquittal was allowed--Absconding accused forcibly kidnapped daughter of appellant--Sessions Judge acquitted respondents of charge on ground of delay in FIR--Abductee in her statement u/S. 161 Cr.P.C. stated that she had gone alongwith accused with her own accord and married him--Delay in FIR was very much explained in written report--Before taking into consideration consent of abductee, Session Judge was under legal obligation to have first determined her age because appellant in his Court deposition has shown her age about 10-11 years--Appellant moved an application for calling representative of NADRA to produce form but Sessions Judge without considering said application or disposing it off at a pre-mature stage acquitted respondents on their application u/S. 265-K Cr.P.C.--Before taking into consideration consent of abductee Sessions Judge should have first determined her age which could have been either ascertained from NADRA record or from medical certificate--As such, before hearing arguments on application filed u/S. 265-K, Cr.P.C., Sessions Judge should allowed application filed by appellant u/S. 540, Cr.P.C. and have examined representative of NADRA and medical officer who examined victim--Appeal allowed.    [Pp. 533, 534 & 536] A, B, E, F & H
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
----S. 161--Statement recorded u/S. 161, Cr.P.C. is not substantial piece of evidence but can be used for limited purpose of contradicting a witness at trial.  [P. 534] C
2007 MLD 372, rel.
Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860)--
----S. 361--Minor girl--Removal from lawful guardian--Kidnapping from lawful guardianship--Any minor girl under 16 years of age removed from lawful guardian without consent of such guardian amounts to kidnapping and consent of victim is of no avail.    [P. 534] D
1986 SCMR 35, ref.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
----S. 265-K--Applicability of--Although recording of evidence before order of acquittal u/S. 265-K is not requirement of law, yet S. 265-K Cr.P.C. could not be pressed into service to stiffle or thwart prosecution as powers u/S. 265-K were not intended to be exercised arbitrarily and capriciously without providing an opportunity to prosecution or complainant to produce prosecution witnesses.
      [P. 535] G
2005 SCMR 1544, ref.
Mr. Khushnood Ahmed, Advocate for Appellant.
Mr. Kamran Murtaza, Mr. Habib Jalib, Advocates and Malik Sultan Mehmood, A.A.G. for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 6.11.2008.
Judgment
Akhtar Zaman Malghani, J.--This Criminal acquittal appeal is directed against the order dated 29.08.2008 rendered by Sessions Judge, Loralai whereby Respondents No. 1 to 4 were acquitted of the charge on their application filed under Section 265-K Cr.P.C.
2.  Briefly stated, facts of case are that on 07.12.2005 a case under Sections 147/148/149 and 365 P.P.C was registered in Levies Station Mekhtar on the report of Haji Muhammad Rafiq alleging therein that during the night in between 8th and 9th November, 2005 respondents alongwith absconding accused forcibly abducted his daughter Kheyal Bibi aged about 10-11 years on account of previous enmity. It appears from record that during investigation Respondents No. 1 to 4 were arrested whereas police could not lay hand upon remaining nominated accused persons, as such; a challan was submitted showing them absconders. On commencement of trial charge was read over to respondents to which they pleaded not guilty whereafter prosecution produced witnesses. In the meanwhile respondents moved an application under Section 265-K Cr.P.C which was allowed and they were acquitted of the charge.
3.  We have heard the learned counsel for appellant as well as learned counsel for respondents. Learned counsel for appellant vehemently contended that Sessions Judge acquitted the respondents at a pre-mature stage without appreciating peculiar facts and circumstances of instant case mainly on the ground of delay in FIR and taking into consideration statement of abductee recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C thereby coming to the conclusion that she had gone alongwith Dad Muhammad at her own accord and she was not forcibly abducted which conclusion was contrary to record and law as admittedly  Kheyal Bibi was below 16 years age and her consent was immaterial. He further contended that delay in FIR was explained by complainant in his statement, as such; same could not have been made basis for acquittal. He further argued that during trial an application was moved under Section 540 Cr.P.C for calling representative of NADRA and Medical Officer who examined abductee and issued medical certificate in order to ascertain age of abductee but without deciding such application learned Sessions Judge in hurried manner acquitted respondents of the charge which findings being perverse are liable to be set aside.
On the other hand learned counsel for respondents vehemently contended that there was no evidence on record to implicate respondents in the commission of offence, as such; they were rightly acquitted of the charge as alleged abductee herself gone alongwith absconding accused Dad Muhammad and married him. He further contended that respondents carried double presumption of innocence, as such; acquittal order was not liable to be interfered with. In support of his contentions learned counsel referred to judgments reported in 2006 P.Cr.L.J 1292 and 2007 P.Cr.L.J 1288.
4.  We have carefully considered the contentions put forth by parties' learned counsel and have also gone through the impugned judgment as well as evidence on record. According to prosecution version respondents alongwith absconding accused forcibly kidnapped daughter of appellant namely Kheyal Bibi during the night between 8th and 9th November, 2005. Perusal of judgment would indicate that Sessions Judge, Loralai acquitted respondents of the charge on the ground of delay in FIR, abductee in her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C stated that she had gone alongwith Dad Muhammad with her own accord and married him and `Nikah Nama'.
5.  As regards delay in FIR same was very much explained in written report Ex.P/1-A which was reproduced by Sessions Judge in his judgment wherein it was stated that on 09.11.2005 he informed about incident whereafter he filed an application before Sessions Court on 24.11.2005 complaining against respondents for kidnapping his daughter aged about 10-11 years which facts were also reiterated by him in his Court deposition but Sessions Judge by over looking said facts illegally took into consideration delay in lodging FIR for making it basis for acquittal by making reference to an incomplete answer given by appellant in cross-examiantion without considering his explanation that no officer was ready to entertain his application complaining about kidnapping of his daughter.
6.  Similarly reliance on the statement of Kheyal Bibi recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C without her examination in the Court was based on ignorance of law as it is well settled that statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C is not substantial piece of evidence but can be used for limited purpose of contradicting a witness at the trial. In the judgment reported in 2007 MLD 372 in this regard it was held as under:-
"In view of above statement of eye-witnesses discussed, the contention of learned counsel for appellant Azam that complainant had tried to improve his 154, Cr.P.C statement in his statement on oath as he had not disclosed in his 154, Cr.P.C statement that the event happened 2, 3 days prior to the day of incident were disclosed to him by his sister, mother and deceased. So also P.Ws. have not given the detailed features in their 161, Cr.P.C statement to justify that they could recognize the appellants at later stage. That might be so but the statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C statement is not a substantive piece of evidence, however it can be used for the purpose of contradiction".
7.  Furthermore; under Section 361 P.P.C any minor girl under 16 years of age removed from lawful guardian without consent of such guardian amounts to kidnapping and consent of victim is of no avail as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in 1986 SCMR 35 wherein it was observed as under:--
"The arguments with regard to consent would not be of any avail to the petitioner as the victim of the crime was of age specified in the definition of "kidnapping from lawful guardianship" in Section 361, P.P.C namely, sixteen years and the said section according to the law is to be read for discovering the definition of kidnapping for purpose of Section 11 of the Ordinance".
Therefore, before taking into consideration consent of Kheyal Bibi, Sessions Judge was under legal obligation to have first determined her age because appellant in his Court deposition has shown her age about 10-11 years and has moved an application for calling representative of NADRA to produce the form but Sessions Judge without considering the said application or disposing it off at a pre-mature stage acquitted the respondents on their application under Section 265-K Cr.P.C. It may be observed that under Section 540 Cr.P.C the Court or Magistrate is under legal obligation to examine any witness whose evidence appears to be essential for just decision of case and in the instant case consent of Kheyal Bibi gained vital importance, therefore, before taking into consideration such consent learned Sessions Judge should have first determined  her   age  which  could  have  been  either  ascertained  from NADRA record or from medical certificate, as such; before hearing arguments on the application filed under Section 265-K Cr.P.C, Sessions Judge should have allowed application filed by appellant under Section 540 Cr.P.C and have examined representative of NADRA and medical officer who examined the victim.
8.  The record further reveals that Kheyal Bibi was also examined by Judicial Magistrate, Kohlu who has shown her age as 15 years, as such; her such statement should have also been brought on record.
9.  Although recording of evidence before order of acquittal under Section 265-K Cr.P.C is not requirement of law; yet Section 265-K Cr.P.C could not be pressed into service to stiffle or thwart prosecution as powers under Section 265-K Cr.P.C were not intended to be exercised arbitrarily and capriciously without providing an opportunity to prosecution or complainant to produce prosecution witnesses. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in 2005 SCMR 1544 held as under:--
"On consideration of arguments of Dr. Qazi Khalid Ali, Additional Advocate-General and Ch. Aitzaz Ahsan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and the case-law relied upon by both of them in support of their respective contentions, there can be no dispute that an application under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C can be filed, taken up for hearing and decided at any time or stage of the proceedings and the words nat any stage" `denote that the application under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C can be filed even before prosecution evidence had been recorded or while the exercise of recording of evidence is going or when the exercise is over. It is, however, to be noted that though there is no bar for an accused person to file application under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. at any stage of the proceedings of the case yet the facts and circumstances of the prosecution case will have to be kept in mind and considered in deciding the viability or feasibility of filing an application at any particular stage. The special or peculiar facts and circumstances of a prosecution case may not warrant filling of an application at a stage when the entire prosecution evidence had been recorded and the case was fixed for recording of statement of the accused under Section 342, Cr.P.C. This Court in the cases of Bashir Ahmed v. Zafar Ul Islam PLD 2004 SC 298 and Muhammad Sharif v. The State and another PLD 1999 SC 1063 (supra) did not approve decision of criminal cases on an application under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C or such allied or similar provisions of law, namely, Section 265-K Cr.P.C and observed that usually a criminal case should be allowed to be disposed of on merits after recording of the prosecution evidence, statement of the accused under Section 342, Cr.P.C, recording of statement of accused under Section 340 (2), Cr.P.C. if so desired by the accused persons and hearing the arguments of the counsel of the parties and that the provisions of Section 249-A, Section 265-K and Section 561-A of the Cr.P.C should not normally be pressed into action for decision of fate of a criminal case".
10.  The judgments referred to by learned counsel for respondents are distinguishable on facts and circumstances as in the judgment reported in 2007 P.Cr.L.J 1288 there was un-explained delay whereas in the instant case, as already observed the delay was sufficiently explained.
11.  Similarly the judgment reported in 2006 P.Cr.L.J 1292 is also distinguishable because in the instant case in view of what have been discussed prima facie respondents were involved in the offence, however; they were acquitted by Sessions Judge on the basis of inadmissible evidence as well as by mis-reading evidence on record.
12.  Before parting with the judgment we would like to observe that conduct of investigation officer is also not above board because despite recovery of Kheyal Bibi he neither produced her before any medical officer to ascertain her age and allowed her to go alongwith absconding accused without arresting that accused or taking permission from Court with regard to her custody, as such; copy of this judgment be forwarded to the Senior MBR for enquiry and initiating proceedings against him in accordance with law.
For the fore going reasons, we are inclined to allow this appeal and after setting aside the judgment/order dated 29.8.2008 rendered by Sessions Judge, Loralai remand the case with direction to call for record from NADRA as well as statement of Kheyal Bibi recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C by Judicial Magistrate, Kohlu and examine medical officer who issued medical lego certificate of victim and thereafter proceed in the matter in accordance with law.
Appeal is disposed of accordingly.
(Sh.A.S.)   Appeal allowed

Kinds of cases which a family court can entertain


PLJ 2009 SC 626
[Appellate Jurisdiction]
Present: Muhammad Moosa K. Leghari, Syed Zawwar Hussain Jaffery & Sheikh Hakim Ali, JJ.
EJAZ NASEEM--Petitioner
versus
FAREEHA AHMAD and others--Respondents
C.P. No. 1490 of 2008, decided on 3.12.2008.
(On appeal from the order/judgment dated 31.10.2008 passed by Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Writ Petition No. 2938 of 2006).
West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--
----S. 5--Suit for dissolution of marriage on bases of khula--Jurisdiction--Section 5 of Family Courts Act has conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon a Family Court to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon matters specified in Part I of Schedule Family Court was passed of the jurisdiction by the Family Courts Act, to adjudicate upon all those matter, pleaded as counter claim in the written statement--Not only dissolution of marriage yet dower, maintenance, restitution of conjugal rights, custody of children, guardianship, jactitation of marriage, dowery, personal property and belongings of wife are entered and included in the schedule.   [P. 629] A
Estoppel--
----Consent decree on basis of compromise--When particularly the consent decree was allowed to be passed by the petitioner himself on the basis of compromise entered into by him, without any objection to it--An estoppel as against the petitioner who had through his own representation allowed the defendant to accept the compromise and had let the compromise become a concent decree of the Court.
      [P. 630] B
Consent Decree--
----Delay of 390 days--Not be condoned--Consent decree passed against him at the stage of execution petition, and through an appeal which was barred by inordinate delay of 390 days, which could not reasonably be condoned on any sound reasoning.    [P. 630] C
Mr. Ibad-ur-Rehman Lodhi, ASC and Mr. Ejaz Muhammad Khan, AOR (absent) for Petitioner.
Khawaja Muhammad Farooq, ASC for Respondent No. 1.
Nemo for Respondents Nos. 2 & 3.
Date of hearing: 3.12.2008.
Order
Sheikh Hakim Ali, J.--Dr. Ejaz Naseem, the present petitioner of the instant civil petition had contracted marriage with Mst. Fareeha Ahmad on 31st October 1992. From this wedlock, two daughters namely Laiba Ejaz and Rahima Ejaz were born. According to petitioner, in the month of May 2002, cordial and friendly relations became strained and uncongenial atmosphere prevailed which resulted in the institution of a suit for restitution of conjugal rights by the petitioner, against Mst. Fareeha Ahmad, defendant/Respondent No.1. After appearing in the suit, Mst. Fareeha Ahmed, defendant filed a written statement claiming therein dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula, recovery of cash to the tune of Rs.2,90,000/- and personal belongings i.e. jewelry and house hold goods, etc. as per list appended in the form of Annexure A and payment of maintenance for herself at the rate of Rs.20,000/- per month, while for minor daughters at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per month each with effect from January 2002. She also claimed Rs. 1,75,000/- as maternity expenses for the above noted two children, and Rs.438,428/- as educational expenses, incurred on the schooling of both these minor daughters with effect from 2001 to 2004. Issues were framed but before the evidence could be produced, parties entered into a compromise, which was produced by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in the shape of an Affidavit, and was brought on the case file as Mark "A" through the statement of the learned counsel for the plaintiff. The compromise was accepted by the learned counsel for the defendant, and on 7.5.2005, the learned Judge Family Court, Islamabad, decreed the counter claim of the defendant in accordance with the affidavit Mark "A", while the dissolution of marriage was decreed when the petitioner had consented to it. On 2.12.2005, an execution petition was filed by Mst. Fareeha Ahmad, Respondent No. 1, in which an objection petition was filed by Dr. Ejaz Naseem, which was dismissed on 21.4.2006. Revision was filed against that order but it was withdrawn on 6.9.2006. Thereafter, an appeal under Section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") along with an application for condonation of delay of 390 days, was filed. Learned District Judge, Islamabad, accepted the appeal on 22.9.2006 and remanded the case to the learned Family Court for trial afresh. This judgment was challenged by Mst. Fareeha Ahmed before the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, through Writ Petition No. 2938 of 2006 which was accepted through the impugned judgment dated 31.10.2008 by setting aside the judgment of learned District Judge, Islamabad, and upholding the judgment and decree dated 7.5.2005 of the learned Judge Family Court, in favour of Mst. Fareeha Ejaz, Respondent No. 1. Hence, this civil petition for leave to appeal by Dr. Ejaz Naseem.
2. Petitioner's learned counsel submits that the learned Judge Family Court, had got no jurisdiction to pass the decree on the basis of compromise because in the written statement, the defendant-wife could be allowed to make the claim for dissolution of marriage only including on the basis of khula, in accordance with sub-clause (1b) of sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act. The suit could not be decreed by the learned Judge Family Court, with regard to other claims pleaded and raised in the written statement of Respondent No. 1. Learned counsel further submits that consent of the party could not confer jurisdiction upon the Court when it had got no statutory conferment. He has referred to the following judgments:--
(1)   Muhammad Afzal v. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan and another (PLD 1967 S.C. 314);
(2)   Ali Muhammad and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others (PLD 1996 S.C. 292); and
(3)   Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Messrs Conforce Limited and others (2001 CLC 1741).
3.  On the other learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 1 submits that there was no prohibition to make such claims in the written statement, if the learned Judge Family Court was empowered by law to have the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate all those claims, claimed by Respondent No. 1 in her written statement. Petitioner had not raised any objection with regard to the jurisdiction of the learned Judge Family Court at the time of passing of the decree or at any time after the filing of written statement by Respondent No. 1 in that Court. Even issues framed had not contained any such issue with regard to the jurisdiction of the learned Judge Family Court. When such was the case and the compromise was entered into by plaintiff himself voluntarily, in such an event, plaintiff was estopped to plead question of jurisdiction particularly in the execution petition which was filed before the concerned executing Court. Appeal filed under Section 14 of the Act was badly barred by time and was rightly dismissed by the learned Judge in Chamber of the High Court.
4.  After giving anxious thoughts to the points raised, facts noted and to the judgments quoted, we are not inclined to grant leave in this civil petition, because Section 5 of the Act has conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon a Family Court to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon matters specified in Part-I of the Schedule to the Act. We have noted that Part I of the Schedule contains all those subjects for which claims/prayers were made by Respondent No. 1 before the Family Court in her written statement. In other words, the Family Court was possessed of the jurisdiction by the aforementioned Act to adjudicate upon all those matters, pleaded as counter claim in the written statement. Not only dissolution of marriage yet dower, maintenance, restitution of conjugal rights, custody of children, guardianship, jactitation of marriage, dowry, personal property and belongings of wife are entered and included in the Schedule. To explain it more, the jurisdiction of the learned Judge Family Court extends to decide all those disputes which arise with regard to the items noted in Part I of the Schedule. To examine it from another angle, the learned Judge Family Court had got the jurisdiction to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon all those disputed items, which were pleaded, claimed and raised by respondent Fareeha Ahmad in her written statement. There was not a single  item  noted in the written statement which could be disputed and deemed to be falling outside the ambit of the jurisdiction of the learned Judge Family Court. Therefore, the most vehemently raised objection by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Judge Family Court had got no jurisdiction could not be proved a sound and valid argument. At the most, the plaintiff could have raised that the counter claims were containing multifarious prayers and reliefs, for which the defendant could be ordered to bring out separate suits for those prayers/reliefs/claims if the Court had considered it appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The failure to raise such objection by the plaintiff/petitioner, at the opportune moment, he can not now be permitted to plead it at this stage, when particularly the consent decree was allowed to be passed by the petitioner himself on the basis of compromise entered into by him, without any objection to it. It has now created an estoppel as against the petitioner who had through his own representation allowed the Defendant/Respondent No.1 to accept the compromise and had let the compromise become a consent decree of the Court. It does not now lie in the mouth of petitioner to challenge that consent decree passed against him especially at the stage of execution petition, and through an appeal which was barred by inordinate delay of 390 days, which could not reasonably be condoned on any sound reasoning.
5.  Accordingly, we have not found any illegality in the impugned judgment of the Islamabad High Court. The Civil Petition is dismissed and the leave is refused.
(M.S.A.)    Leave refused.