Wednesday 25 September 2013

What is inquest report? What is the importance of an inquest report?

PLJ 2009 FSC 41 [Appellate Jurisdiction] Present: Haziqaul Khairi, CJ, Salahuddin Mirza & Syed Afzal Haider, JJ. SAEED ULLAH and others--Appellants versus STATE and others--Respondents J.Crl. Appeal No. 17/L of 2003, Crl. Appeal No. 128/L of 2002, Crl. Appeal No. 129/L of 2002 & Crl. Revision No. 29/L of 2002, decided on 14.11.2008.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)------S. 174 r/w Police Rules, 1934, Rr. 25-35--Inquest report--Investigation--Important document--Held: Inquest report is a very important document in the chain of investigation--It is recorded immediately on receipt of information about the death of a person--It is of course correct that it is not incumbent upon police officer to give the names of the witnesses but this document being almost the earliest is the result of the investigation about the cause of death, manner in which death was caused and the weapon used in the Commission of the offence--This past of the investigation is usually occasioned by the information imparted by the aggrieved party. [P. 50] A Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860)------Ss. 302(b) & 377--Conviction and sentence--Challenge to--Benefit of doubt--Unseen occurrence--Deadbody was not identified by complainant--Offence of Sodomy and murder--Complainant, father of victim, does not mention presence of PWs--Fact of their presence at spot was not reflected in inquest report--Non-mention of these witnesses in Crime Report as well as Inquest Report was not free from suspicion--Recovery of dead body from roof top of other house was not proved nor has it been established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant threw dead body there--There was improvement made by complainant who at a later stage, relying upon information given by PW, stated that son and wife of appellant helped him in depositing dead body on roof top of another house--Sack containing dead body was not identified in Court by complainant and, therefore, there was no evidence to show that there was a sack which was said to contain dead body and was found lying on roof top of a neighbour who was neither associated with investigation nor produced as a witness--Incident was admittedly an unseen occurrence and only evidence on record to connect appellant was deposition of PW who allegedly saw him carrying a sack alongwith two other persons--Presence of this PW at spot was doubtful--He was a chance witness and his statement did not inspire confidence--No evidence whatsoever that deceased was last seen with appellant--It was not even alleged by mother of deceased PW that appellant even called child upstairs--Co-accused, wife of appellant, has already been acquitted of charge of disappearance of evidence by trial Court extending her benefit of doubt on same set of evidence as is available against appellant--Proseuction must prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts--Held: Liberty and other rights cannot be jeopardized on account of conjectures or surmises or deposition of chance witnesses who give a twist to story--Appellant acquitted on the base of benefit of doubt--Appeal accepted. [Pp. 51 & 52] A, B, C, D, E, F & G Mr. Said Ullah Khaid, Advocate for Appellant (in J. Cr. Appeal No. 17/L of 2003). Mehdi Khan Chohan, Advocate for Appellants (in Cr. A. Nos. 128, 129 and Cr. Rev. 29/L of 2002). Mr. Asjad Javed Ghural, DPG for State. Date of hearing: 17.9.2008. Judgment Syed Afzal Haider, J.--Through this single Judgment, three appeals and one revision petition are being decided. These petitions are (i) Jail Criminal Appeal No. 17/L/2003 filed by Saeed Ullah against his conviction and sentence, (ii) Criminal Appeal No. 128/L/2002 filed by complainant Muhammad Inayat against acquittal of accused/Respondent No. 1 Mst. Feeza Bibi, (iii) Criminal Appeal No. 129/L/2002 filed by complainant Muhammad Inayat against acquittal of accused/Respondent No. 1 Shakil Abbas, a minor, tried under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 and (iv) Criminal Revision No. 29/L/2002 seeking enhancement of sentence of appellant Saeed Ullah from life imprisonment to death sentence. All these petitions are directed against the judgment dated 28.03.2002 delivered by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gujrat. 2. The appellant Saeed Ullah has been convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life and also directed to pay cash Rs. 4,00,000/- as compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure to legal heirs of the deceased, in default whereof to further undergo 6 months' simple imprisonment. He has also been convicted under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 4,00,000/-, in default whereof to further undergo simple imprisonment for six months whereas co-accused Mst. Feeza Bibi and Shakil Abbas have been acquitted of the charges by extending them benefit of doubt. PROSECUTION VERSION 3. Brief facts of the prosecution story as culled from the crime Report No. 72/2001, dated 27.01.2001, registered under Sections 302/377/201 of the Pakistan Penal Code read with Section 12 of the Offence of Zina Ordinance, 1979 are that the complainant Muhammad Inayat, PW. 1 alleged that:--"I am resident of Mohallah Sultanabad and the first floor has been rented out to Saeed Ullah accused who is residing there with his wife Mst. Feeza Bibi (co-accused). I am a shopkeeper having two sons and three daughters. On 27.01.2001 at about 7:10 p.m. when I arrived after closing the shop, my brother-in-law Muhammad Ijaz PW was present in his house where he was busy talking with his sister (wife of the complainant), I inquired about my six years' son Dilawar Hussain deceased from my wife. She informed that the son had gone upstairs. After having meal I again inquired and extended a call with no reply from upstairs. Then I went upstairs and observed that Saeed Ullah and his wife Mst. Feeza Bibi accused persons were washing the floor. On inquiry, they replied that my son Dilawar deceased had not come upstairs. I again inquired from my wife that the deceased had not gone upstairs when his wife Mst. Shahnaz Akhtar and brother-in-law Ijaz PWs also came upstairs. They confronted Saeed Ullah accused stating that the deceased had come upstairs in their sight on the signal of Shakil accused son of Saeed Ullah. Thereafter all the three persons started tracing out Dilawar Hussain deceased and enquired from the neighbourhood. It consumed sufficient time and for the same purpose went to the top storey as well. There on the roof of the house of Ahmad son of Sultan Mochi, resident, of the same vicinity they observed that a Nylon sack was lying on the gravel. The sack was checked and the person of his son Dilawar, whose clothes were wet, was found. He was removed from the sack and it was found that he had expired. In enquiry it was found that Saeed Ullah accused had committed sodomy upon the deceased for which reason the blood started oozing out of the body and in order to conceal the offence both the accused washed the floor. The accused bathed the dead body in the bath tub and concealed the same in a sack and then threw it on the third roof the house belonging to Ahmad Mochi". 4. The learned trial Court on 24.11.2001 framed charge against accused Saeedullah Khan (appellant), Mst. Faeza Bibi, the acquitted accused and Shakil Abbas minor, acquitted accused for offences punishable under Sections 12 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance VII of 1979, read with Sections 302(a), 377 and 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. PROSECUTION EVIDENCE 5. To prove its case, the prosecution produced as many as 13 witnesses. Summery of their depositions is being detailed below:--(a) PW-1 Muhammad Inayat, complainant of the case, made almost the same statement as narrated in his complaint Ex.PA. During cross-examination, he denied the suggestion that due to dispute over rent of the house he in collaboration with other PWs falsely roped the accused persons Mst. Feeza Bibi and Shakeel Abbas in the case. He also denied the suggestion that the accused were innocent and he had falsely deposed. He denied the suggestion that in connivance with the local police he got the investigation of this case conducted in a dishonest manner. He also denied the suggestion that he had made a false improvement to strengthen this case. (b) PW-2 , Mst. Shahnaz Akhtar, wife of the complainant Muhammad Inayat, supported the complainant. During cross-examination, she stated that no witness was produced by them before the police who might have seen the sodomy being committed on the person of Dilawar deceased. She denied the suggestion that she had introduced herself as a false witness in this case being mother of the deceased. (c) PW-3 Constable Pervaiz Ahmad, posted at Police Station Lorri Adda, is a formal witness. He stated that on 27.01.2001, he escorted dead body of the deceased Dilawar Hussain for post-mortem examination to the mortuary of A.B.S Hospital, Gujrat. After post-mortem, the doctor handed over to him the post-mortem report and clothes of the deceased which he handed over to the Investigating Officer in presence of Ghulam Rasool and Hayat, both of them not produced at the trial. During cross-examination, he denied the suggestion that the crime sack P-4 was not handed over to him by the doctor and he in connivance with the Investigating Officer falsely mentioned sack P-4 in memo of recovery Ex.P-E. He also denied the suggestion that he was deposing falsely. (d) PW-4 Constable Muhammad Iqbal, Police Station Civil Lines, Gujrat is also a formal witness. He stated that on 01.02.2001, Muhammad Riaz Moharrir/Head Constable handed over to him one sealed packet and a sealed envelope for onward transmission to the office of Chemical Examiner, Lahore and one sealed packet and a sealed envelope for onward transmission to the office of Pathalogist, Lahore. On 02.04.2001, Muhammad Akhtar Moharrir handed over to him a parcel, said to contain blood stained clothes, for onward transmission to the office of Chemical Examiner which he delivered in the concerned offices on the same day intact. (e) PW-5 Amjad Hussain son of Muhammad Shafi stated that on 27.01.2001, he and Ghulam Rasool PW, not produced, went to collect rent from Muhammad Aslam for the house of Fayyaz. He claims to be sitting in the house of said Fayyaz where he heard some noise. The sound of foot steps was heard by him and thus came out to see what was all about. He saw the accused carrying a nylon sack, (on the roof top of another house), going towards the adjacent house. On his enquiry, they said that it contained nothing. When he came outside of the house he saw the complainant Inayat present in the street who informed him that his son was missing. They went to "the house of Inayat P.W. that he went upstairs but the inmates of upper portion do not agree. Inayat P.W. and Shahnaz and I also went upstairs. Both Inayat and Shahnaz were stressing the accused that Dilawar had come upstairs and now why do you not accept. I informed to Inayat and Shahnaz Bibi P.W. that the accused present in Court were carrying a sack and were proceeding towards the east. I accompanied the Inayat and Shahnaz Bibi PWs. We found a sack lying on the roof of Haji Sultan. The sack contained dead body of the deceased. On 27.01.2001, police reached on the spot/place of occurrence. The police took into possession one stair P-5, cap P-6, Prouly (piece of cloth) P-7 and Tab P-8 which were taken into possession by Police through memo Ex.P-C and in my presence I signed the same and also Ghulam Rasool PW affixed his thumb impression." During cross-examination, he denied the suggestion that he had perjured himself and deposed falsely on account of relationship with the complainant party. (f) PW-6 Akhtar Naqqash Draftsman stated that on 29.01.2001 he took rough notes and prepared site-plan. During cross-examination, he denied the suggestion that as no body instructed him about the place where the PWs were sitting on the ground floor so he had not mentioned their presence in the site-plan and that in order to strengthen the prosecution case he had drafted a wrong site-plan at the direction of the police. (g) PW-7 Dr. Muhammad Rafique of A.B.S Hospital, Gujrat stated that on 27.01.2001 at about 8:05 p.m, he conducted post-mortem examination on the dead body of Dilawar Hussain deceased aged about 6 years who was wearing dark blue pent, blue shirt, vest white, Jarsi milky coloured. The doctor found multiple lacerations on lumbo-sacral region on the back. Excess bleeding was present around the anus and perineum. Scalp and skull were intact. Brain was congested. He further stated that examination of perennial and anal area showed that sodomy was committed upon the deceased. During cross-examination, he stated that in post-mortem report Ex.PE, he had not opined about commission of sodomy of the deceased. He denied the suggestion that no sodomy was committed upon the deceased. (h) PW-8 Amir Bashir son of Muhammad Bashir stated that on 18.04.2001 while he was posted as Foot Constable in Police Post Lorri Adda, warrants of arrest of appellant Saeed Ullah were handed over to him by the Investigating Officer but inspite of his hectic efforts, the appellant was not traceable. Thereafter, he affixed proclamation of appellant Saeed Ullah at his house. During cross-examination, he stated that on the day when he affixed the proclamation, the house was locked outside. (i) PW-9 Gulzar Ahmad, Sub-Inspector, Police Station Civil Lines, Gujrat stated that on 27.01.2001 on receiving complaint Ex.PA, he registered the F.I.R Ex.PA/1 without any addition or omission. (j) PW-10 Mehdi Khan Assistant Sub-Inspector, Police Station Civil Lines, Gujrat stated that on 15.09.200, the appellant Saeed Ullah was arrested in District Jail Mardan where from he got him transferred to District Jail Gujrat. On 16.07.2001, he took the physical remand of appellant Saeed Ullah. He investigated the case and forwarded him to stand trial. He admitted the suggestion that the complainant conceded before him that Saeed Ullah "is not the accused, has not committed the sodomy, nor commit to murder". He admitted that as per his finding accused was neither guilty of committing sodomy nor of murder. (k) PW-11 Muhammad Arshad son of Muhammad Shafi identified the dead body of the deceased at the time of post-mortem examination. (l) PW-12 Mian Muhammad Javed Sub-Inspector stated that on 27.01.2001 while he was posted at Police Station Civil Lines, Gujrat, he, after receiving information, reached at the place of occurrence. Zeeshan Sub-Inspector/PW Incharge Police Postwas already present there. Fard Bian of the complainant Ex.PA, for registration of the case, had already been sent to Police Station Civil Lines Gujrat. He further stated that he inspected the place of occurrence and confirmed the spot inspection already carried out by Zeeshan Iqbal Sub-Inspector. On 2.2.2001, he arrested Shakil Abbas accused from Factory area. On 04.02.2001, Akhtar Hussain Draftsman handed over to him site-plans Ex.P-D and Ex.P-D/1 which he took into possession. He recorded the statement of draftsman. On 06.02.2001, he submitted the incomplete challan against Mst. Feeza Bibi and Shakil Abbas accused after finding them guilty. On 26.04.2001, he obtained proclamation with regard to Saeed Ullah appellant and entrusted the same to Constable Amar Bashir PW and recorded his statement. During cross-examination, he admitted the suggestion that the proclamation of appellant Saeed Ullah Ex.P-L contained the address of District Mardan. He further stated that he did not record any of the statement of eye-witnesses in this regard and that there was no direct evidence of any eye-witnesses on the file regarding sodomy or commission of murder by Mst. Feeza Bibi and Shakil accused nor there was any evidence of extra judicial confession. We have noticed that the names of Ghulam Rasool and Amjad P.Ws were not mentioned in the inquest report. (m) PW-13 Javed Iqbal Sub-Inspector, Police Station Sodhra, District Gujranwala stated that Zeshan Iqbal Sub-Inspector/Investigating Officer of the case had been serving under him and he was familiar with and could recognize his handwriting and signatures. He recorded the statement of the complainant Ex.P-A on 27.01.2001 for registration of case. On 27.01.2001, he inspected the spot, recorded the statements of the complainant, Shahnaz Akhtar and Muhammad Amjad. On 28.01.2001, he recorded the statements of Arshad, Constable Pervaiz Ahmad, Ghulam Rasool, Muhammad Hayat and Ijaz PWs under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On 03.02.2001, Shakil Abbas were arrested by him and was sent to judicial lock up by Sub-Inspector Zeshan Iqbal. COURT WITNESS 6. There is also the deposition of one Court witness Constable Muhammad Iqbal, Police Station Civil Lines, Gujrat. He stated that he was entrusted with the summons of Zeshan Iqbal Sub-Inspector, Police Post, Larri Adda, Police Station Civil Lines, Gujrat. He proceeded to the residence of said Sub-Inspector and his mother informed him that the Sub-Inspector had proceeded to America four months ago. DEFENCE EVIDENCE 7. After conclusion of the prosecution evidence, statements of the accused Saeed Ullah and Mst. Feezan Bibi were recorded under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 18.03.2002. Both the accused, inter-alia, pleaded their innocence and asserted that they had been falsely implicated in the case. In reply to the questions "why this case against you and why the P.Ws deposed against you", accused Saeed Ullah stated:--"I have been falsely involved in this case due to enmity. I am retired army Subedar and I have served in the army for 28 years and have cleaned and unchallenged record. I am innocent. I produce defence evidence before the police and the police verified. The police also declared me innocent. I had rented disputed house of the complainant and so he implicated me falsely. The PWs are closely related with the deceased and the complainant." In reply to the questions "why this case against you and why the P.Ws deposed against you", accused Mst. Feeza Bibi stated:--"Due to monetary dispute regarding the rent of house where I was living. The complainant got registered this case against us in order to fulfill the empty belly of prosecution. As a matter of fact by way of registration of this case wanted to get the rented house vacated from me and to receive money from us by way of blackmailing. I am innocent in this case. My son Shakil was also innocent and he has been roped in this case for blackmailing me. The PWs are closely related with the deceased and the complainant." In reply to the questions "why this case against you and why the P.Ws deposed against you", accused Shakil Abbas stated:--"I adopt the version taken by my co-accused Mst. Feeza Bibi. The PWs are closely related with the deceased and the complainant." Neither did the accused opt to produce evidence in their defence nor did any of them elect to depose under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. CONCLUSIONS WITH REASONING 8. We have given careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of this case. The record has also been perused with the assistance of learned counsel for the parties. We are inclined to accept the appeal. The reasons for recording acquittal are reproduced hereunder:--(a) The complainant, both in the crime report and in his deposition before the Court mentioned that Muhammad Ijaz brother of his wife was present in the house when he inquired about his minor son Dilawar Hussain who was stated to be upstairs with the tenants. Muhammad Ijaz is also reported to have accompanied complainant for search within and beyond the limits of the house and reportedly found the dead body in a sack on the roof top of one Ahmad son of Sultan Mochi. It is, however, strange that Muhammad Ijaz and Ahmad Mochi have not been produced in Court. PWs Ijaz Ahmed, Muhammad Hayat and Ghulam Rasool were given up as unnecessary on 13.03.2002 as per statement of Raja Nisar Ahmad, Assistant District Attorney. (b) Amjad Hussain PW-5 resident of Kot Putu, a village three and a half miles away from the place of occurrence, was introduced in the narration of the story only after the registration of First Information Report. He asserts that he informed the complainant that accused was seen carrying a sack but neither any such disclosure was made in the Crime Report nor was his presence, as a member of search party, mentioned in the complaint. (c) Inquest Report is a very important document in the chain of investigation. It is recorded immediately on receipt of information about the death of a person as mandated in Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Police Rules 25.35. It is of course correct that it is not incumbent upon police officer to give the names of the witnesses but this document being almost the earliest is the result of the investigation about the cause of death, manner in which death was caused and the weapon used in the commission of the offence. This part of the investigation is usually occasioned by information imparted by the aggrieved party. In the instant case the complainant, the father of the victim does not mention the presence of Amjad Hussain P.W.5 and Ghulam Rasool. The inquest report was duly signed by Muhammad Bashir and Akhtar Hussain as required by law. Had Amjad Hussain P.W.5 and Ghulam Rasool been present they would have signed the Inquest Report. The fact of their presence at the spot is not reflected in the inquest report. The non-mention of these witnesses in the Crime Report as well the Inquest Report is not free from suspicion. The statement of Amjad Hussain P.W.5 at the same time does not inspire confidence. His entry in the story at a later stage snacks of uncanny improvement by prosecution side. Fayyaz, the absentee landlord is brother of P.W.1 as disclosed by P.W.2 but how come that P.W.1 does not collect rent from his neighborhood on behalf of his brother. (d) The site-plan does not support the prosecution version and it is bereft of crucial details. (e) The recovery of dead body from the roof top of Ahmad Mochi is not proved nor has it been established beyondreasonable doubt that the appellant threw the dead body there. In fact there is improvement made by the complainant who at a later stage, relying upon the information given by Inayat Hussain P.Ws and Ghulam Rasool since given up, stated that the son and wife of appellant helped him in depositing the dead body on the rooftop of Ahmad Mochi. Why was PW-5 present in the house of Muhammad Aslam tenant of Muhammad Fayyaz at 6.30/7.00 p.m. during chilly January?. His presence there is neither endorsed by Muhammad Aslam nor Ghulam Rasool. He neither holds power of attorney on behalf of Muhammad Fayyaz, the absentee landlord, nor even a Rukka from the wife of the latter authorizing him to collect rent is before us. No receipt of payment of rent is available on record. The witness in order to fit in as a witness mentions 6.30/7.00 p.m. as the time of his arrival in the house adjoining the place of occurrence and he then prolongs his stay so that he could become a potential witness because the incident is alleged to have occurred at 7.10 p.m. There is no earthly prospect for a person, sitting on a cup of tea in a room in a cold evening, to witness in detail the movement of three persons carrying a sack on the roof top of another house when there is no source of light either. (f) PW-2 introduced a new dimension to the story when she stated that the dead body was taken to Pak Fan Industry after the police had taken hold of the dead body. The reason of this, as narrated by the mother of deceased P.W.2, was that the boy was taken to the Industry for being checked up where it transpired that the patient was dead. This aspect does not fit in with the story of the child being packed in a sack and thrown on roof top with wet clothes in cold evening. The police was not accompanying the boy/his family members when he was taken to the Pak Fan Industry for check up. If this part of the story, as narrated by the real mother is to be believed, then the very basis of crime report as regards the time, place and culprit is smashed. The child was brought back home after covering a distance of three miles and it was then, the mother states that the police arrived. In this state of affairs the very basis of the Inquest Report is demolished. Afterwards the complainant party reportedly accompanied the child to the hospital. Even this statement needs careful consideration. If the child was dead, as confirmed by Pak Fan doctor, then there was no need to take the child to A.B.S. Hospital. (g) The sack containing the dead body was not identified in Court by complainant and, therefore, there is no evidence to show that there was a sack which was said to contain the dead body and was found lying on the roof top of a neighbour who was neither associated with investigation nor produced as a witness. (h) There is no convincing evidence available on record to establish the time and the manner in which the victim died. The incident is admittedly an unseen occurrence and the only evidence on record to connect the appellant is the deposition of PW-5 who allegedly saw him carrying a sack alongwith two other persons. The presence of P.W.5 at the spot is doubtful. He is a chance witness. His statement does not inspire confidence. His presence at the spot is not established even in police file. (i) There is no evidence whatsoever that the deceased was last seen with the appellant. It is not even alleged by P.W.2, mother of the deceased, that appellant even called the child upstairs. (j) It is in the evidence of PW. 10 Mehdi Khan that the complainant conceded before him that Saeed Ullah "is not the accused, has not committed the sodomy nor commit to murder." The witness observed that according to his findings the appellant was neither guilty of sodomy nor of murder. 9. The co-accused Mst. Feeza Bibi, wife of appellant has already been acquitted of the charge of disappearance of evidence as contemplated by Section 201 of the Penal Code, by the learned trial Court on the same set of evidence as is available against the appellant. The learned trial Court observed: "hence even a slightest doubt arising in her favour must be extended to her." The case of accused Shakil Abbas was separated as he was a juvenile. He has also been acquitted vide judgment delivered on 28.03.2002 because the only role attributed to him was that he called the deceased upstairs and there was no evidence that he acted in concert with his step father, the appellant in this case. He was also given benefit of doubt. 10. In this view of the matter it is not possible to sustain the conviction recorded by learned trial Court. In order to fix liability the prosecution must prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. It is all the more necessary when the offence alleged by prosecution entails capital punishment. The liberty and other rights cannot be jeopardized on account of conjectures or surmises or deposition of chance witnesses who give a twist to the story. Moreover improvement made by complainant on crucial points reflects adversely on the veracity of prosecution version. In this view of the matter the prosecution story, as alleged, is not free from doubts. Consequently, giving benefit of doubt to the appellant, his appeal, Jail Criminal Appeal No. 17-L of 2003 is hereby accepted and the judgment dated 28.03.2002, whereby he was convicted (a) under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment apart from the penalty of compensation to the tune of Rs. 4,00,000/-, and also (b) under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 4,00,000/- are hereby set aside. Criminal Appeal No. 128-L of 2002 and Criminal Appeal No. 129-L of 2002, both appeals against the acquittal of Mst. Feeza Bibi and Shakil Abbas minor are hereby dismissed for the reasons which have become the basis of acceptance of Jail Criminal Appeal No. 17-L of 2003. Criminal Revision No. 29-L of 2002 seeking enhancement is consequently dismissed. Appellant Saeedullah son of Abdul Minan shall be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required in some other case. (A.S.Sh.) Appeal accepted.

Case of a civil servant

PLJ 2007 Lahore 333 [Multan Bench Multan] Present: Maulvi Anwarul Haq, J. MUHAMMAD UMAR LODHI, DEPUTY MANAGER OPERATION, CANTT. DIVISION, MULTAN--Petitioner versus MANAGING DIRECTOR WAPDA (POWER), LAHORE and another--Respondents W.P. No. 4490 of 2006, decided on 11.9.2006. Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (LXX of 1973)---

---S. 9--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--Art. 199--Right of appeal--Stoppage of annual increment for a period of one year without cumulative effect--Constitutional petition--Penalty of censure was imposed--Right of appeal to Federal Service Tribunal--Validity--Information has been given to civil servant by the office of Tribunal and upon reading of notice of the case was not before the office tribunal--Matter needs to be considered by tribunal with reference to provisions of Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, (XVII of 2000) and right of appeal to Federal Service Tribunal--Petitions were disposed of with direction to petitioner to immediately approach Federal Service Tribunal with an appropriate application bringing relevant facts to the notice of Tribunal and shall be determined by Tribunal. [P. 335] A Sardar Muhammad Sarfraz Dogar, Advocate for Petitioner. Date of hearing: 11.9.2006. Order This order will dispose of Writ Petitions Nos. 4490 & 4492 of 2006 as common question is involved. 2. In both these cases the petitioner was proceeded against under the provisions of Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, (No. XVII of 2000). In the matter of Writ Petition No. 4490 of 2006 a penalty of "Stoppage of one annual increment for a period of one year without cumulative effect" was imposed on 21.3.2006. An appeal filed against the said order was partly allowed on 15.6.2006 and the penalty was converted into "Censure". In Writ Petition No. 4492 of 2006 penalty of "Censure" was imposed vide order dated 20.12.2005. The appeal was rejected on 22.6.2006. Service Appeal No. 623(R)/CE/06 was filed. According to the learned counsel the office of the learned Federal Service Tribunal has informed that in view of the judgment dated 27.6.2006 of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in Civil Appeals Nos. 792 to 816 of 2005 etc. the appeal has abated and he should go to competent forum for redressal. 3. Learned counsel has taken me through the said judgment of the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan. I deem it appropriate to reproduce Para No. 108 of the said judgment here: "108. The threadbare discussion on the subject persuades us to hold:--1. Section 2-A of the STA, 1973 is, partially, ultra vires of Articles 240 and 260 of the Constitution, to the extent of the category of employees, whose terms and conditions of service have not been determined by the Federal Legislature and by a deeming clause they cannot be treated civil servants as defined under Section 2(1)(b) of the CSA, 1973 and they are not engaged in the affairs of the Federation. 2. Section 2-A of the STA, 1973 cannot be enforced in the absence of amendment in the definition of the civil servant under Section 2(1)(b) of the CSA, 1973. 3. The cases of the employees under Section 2-A, STA, 1973, who do not fall within the definition of civil servant as defined in Section 2(1)(b) of the CSA, shall have no remedy before the Service Tribunal, functioning under Article 212 of the Constitution and they would be free to avail appropriate remedy". 4. Now in my humble opinion the said dictum is not attracted to the case of the petitioner before me. As noted by me above he was proceeded against in both these cases under the provisions of said Ordinance, 2000. Now Section 10 of the said Ordinance read as follows: "10. Appeal.--Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any person aggrieved by any final order under Section 9 may, within thirty days of the order, prefer an appeal to the Federal Service Tribunal established under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (LXX of 1973)". It will thus be seen that any person who has been proceeded against under the provisions of the said ordinance and he feels aggrieved of any final order passed under Section 9 as is the position in the case in hand, he has been conferred a right of appeal to the Federal Service Tribunal established under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. It is but apparent that the said information has been given to the petitioner by the office of the learned Tribunal and upon reading of the said notice the said aspect of the case was not before the office of the learned Tribunal. The matter needs to be considered by the learned Tribunal with reference to the provisions of the said Ordinance XVII, 2000 and the right of appeal conferred there under. Both the writ petitions are accordingly disposed of with a direction to the petitioner to immediately approach the learned Federal Service Tribunal with an appropriate application bringing the said relevant facts to the notice of the learned Tribunal and the matter shall be determined by the learned Tribunal. The Office to remit a copy of this order to the Registrar of the learned Federal Service Tribunal at Islamabad. (Rafaqat Ali Sohal) Order accordingly

Can a respondent be deleted to not to be a party?

PLJ 2005 Karachi 21 [Sindh Circuit Hyderabad] Present: Muhammad Mujibullah Siddiqui, J. ARMY WELFARE SUGAR MILLS, WORKERS UNION through its GENERAL SECRETARY--
Applicant versus REGISTRAR TRADE UNIONS, HYDERABAD and 2 others-
-Respondents Labour Revision No. 13 of 2004, decided on 5.5.2004.
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)------O. 1, R. (10) and O. VII, R. 11--Application submitted petitioner that respondent be deleted from the array of parties--Labour Court rejected the application that Complaint was filed by the Registrar or the representation made by respondent wherein the proposition of law and authorities of Superior Courts were brought to the knowledge of Registrar regarding registration of Union and thereafter the Registrar applied for cancellation of registration of petitioner before Labour Court joining the respondent also as a party--Ordinarily in case of registration, Registrar and concerned Union are party but Registrar can move application to the Labour Court for cancellation either suo moto or information laid before it by the employer--Since the complaint was filed at the instance of Management, therefore, Managing authority was necessary party and was rightly joined as respondent in complaint--Held: No justification for the admission of the labour revision--Even case of delay in disposed of matter pending before the Labour Court--No prejudice caused to the applicant with the rejection of application under Order 1, Rule 10 CPC or no omission of justice has been taken place--Even all parties filed their affidavit-in-evidence and all of them had been subjected to cross-examination--No justification for admission of pension application but shall cause delay in disposal of matter--Dismissal in limine. [Pp. 22, 23 & 24] A, B & C Mr. Ghulam Sarwar Chandio, Advocate for Applicant. Mr. Masood Ahmad Noorani, Addl. A.G. for Respondent No. 1. Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani, Advocate for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing : 5.5.2004. Order The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 5.2.2004 passed by the learned Labour Court No. VI, Hyderabad in Complaint No. 48/2003 pending before the learned Labour Court. The petitioner, who is Respondent No. 1 in the complaint before the learned Labour Court, submitted an application that Respondent No. 2 be deleted from the complaint filed by the Registrar, Trade Unions, for the reason that the Management was not a necessary party. It was alleged in the affidavit annexed with the application under Order 1 Rule (10) CPC that the General Manager of the Army Welfare Sugar Mills (Management) has nothing to do with the cancellation of registration of the Union and under Section 12 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 the General Manager of the company was not required to be impleaded as party. It was further stated in Para 5 of the affidavit sworn by Mr. Abdul Salam, General Secretary of the petitioner Workers Union, that only establishment/ company/mills can be impleaded as party, wherever it is necessary and permissible under the law but in the instant case neither General Manager nor establishment are necessary parties. The learned Labour Court dismissed the application with the observation that the issue was already decided by the Court while passing order on application under Order 7, Rule (11) CPC. The copy of order on application under Order 7, Rule (11) CPC referred to in the impugned order dated 5.3.2004 has been produced along with the petition as annexure `A/4'. A perusal thereof shows that an application was submitted on behalf of petitioner on 9.10.2003 praying that the Respondent No. 2 be deleted from the array of parties. The learned Labour Court rejected the application vide order dated 19.2.2004. It is observed in the said order that "the complaint was filed by the Registrar on the representation made by the Respondent No. 2, wherein the propositions of law and authorities of superior Courts were brought to the knowledge of Registrar regarding registration of Union and thereafter the Registrar applied for cancellation of registration of petitioner before the Labour Court joining the Respondent No. 2 also as a costly". The learned Labour Court further observed that ordinarily in case of registration of Trade Union or cancellation of registration the Registrar and the concerned Union are necessary parties and are to be impleaded but the Registrar can move application to the Labour Court for cancellation of the registration either suo

moto or on information laid before it by the employer. With this reference the learned Labour Court examined the issue whether Management was a necessary party and came to the conclusion that since the complaint was filed at the instance of Management, therefore, the Management was necessary party and was rightly joined as Respondent No. 2 in the complaint filed by the Registrar. It was further observed that the under the new Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 the Registrar was required to inform the employer by giving a notice regarding registration of Union and the employer is deemed to be a necessary party in the proceedings even under the repealed Statute. With these observations the application under Order 7, Rule (11) CPC was dismissed. The petitioner feeling aggrieved with the above order dated 19.2.2004, filed a revision application before this Court being Labour Revision Application No. 12/2004. During the course of hearing at Katcha Peshi stage Mr. Ghulam Sarwar Chandio, advocate, informed a learned single Judge of this Court that on 8.9.2003 affidavit-in-evidence has been filed by the Registrar, Trade Union, Hyderabad and the matter was adjourned for cross-examination of the complainant. The revision application was disposed of with the observation that in case cross-examination has not been conducted by the applicant, the Presiding Officer should before hearing arguments on the main petition allow the applicant to cross-examine the Registrar, Trade Union, whose affdavit-in-evidence has been placed on record. The applicant was also given opportunity to produce evidence if so desired. The matter part of the order was necessitated because Mr. Ghulam Sarwar Chandio, advocate, informed the learned single Judge that the matter has been posted for arguments on main petition without giving opportunity of cross-examination to the parties. Be that as it may, the revision application filed against the order dated 19.2.2004, whereby the prayer for deleting the Respondent No. 2 from the array of respondents was disposed of. In the above circumstances this second application under Order 1 Rule (10) CPC seeking same relief which, was sought in the application dated 9.10.2003 under the caption, under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC, was uncalled for. Mr. Ghulam Sarwar Chandio has submitted that the second application was submitted under Order 1, Rule (10) CPC, which is the proper provision of law because the earlier application was submitted under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC, which was not the correct provision of law. The Courts are supposed to consider the contents of the application and not the law which is cited in the application. Mere wrong citation of a provision of law is neither sufficient for rejection of any application nor has any bearing on the merits of the case. I find that, notwithstanding, the wrong citation of law in the application dated 9.10.2003 the prayer in the application was that the Respondent No. 2 was not a necessary party and may be deleted from the array of respondents. The learned Labour Court in it's order dated 19.2.2004 has considered the contention elaborately and has given a finding that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the Management was a necessary party. The order dated 19.2.2004 was assailed in the earlier revision application No. 12/2004. Although there is nothing in the order of learned single Judge of this Court dated 23.2.2004 that the revision application was not admitted for the reason that the application dated 9.10.2003 was shown to have been submitted under Order 7, Rule (11) CPC, but Mr. Ghulam Sarwar Chandio states that the earlier revision application was disposed of for the reason that the application ought to have been submitted under Order 1 Rule (10) CPC. I do not find any such observation in the order of learned single Judge of this Court dated 23.2.2004. I am of the opinion that second round of litigation was uncalled for. coming to the merits, I find that no prejudice has been caused to the applicant with the rejection of application under Order 1, Rule (10) CPC. I have specifically asked Mr. Ghulam Sarwar Chandio, learned Counsel for the applicant, to show as to what prejudice has been caused to the applicant or what is the miscarriage of justice which has taken place. The learned Counsel is not able to show any such prejudice or miscarriage of justice caused to the applicant. Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani, who is appearing before the Labour Court also, has stated that all the parties have filed their affidavit-in-evidence and all of them have been subjected to cross-examination including the Registrar, Trade Union and now the matter has been fixed for final arguments on 11.5.2004. Thus the earlier directions contained in the order dated 23.2.2004 have been complied with. At this stage I do not find any justification for admission of this revision application, which shall cause delay in the disposal of matter pending before the Labour Court. The revision application is dismissed in limine along with the listed application. (N.T.) Application dismissed

How to establish right of pre-emption?

PLJ 2004 Lahore 1211 Present: MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN, J. RIAAZ AHMAD-Petitioner

versus

MUHAMMAD SADIQ-Respondent C.R. No. 2455-D of 1996, decided on 2.1.2004.

Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 (IX of 1991)--—-S. 13-Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908), S. 115-Revision Jurisdiction-Suit for pre-emption-Trial Court found that plaintiff tu superior right, but on basis of appraisal of evidence, suit of petitioner w; dismissed-Plaintiff s appeal also met same fate-Validity-Petiitoner i doubt has superior pre-emptive rights and has so been held by Couiah.below-Pre-empt sale in favour of respondent, asserted in plaint came to know of sale in dispute and immediately made jumping demand that he will pre-empt it as his right superior and in this manner performed talab-e-muwathibat and thereafter made talb-e-Iskkad-Knowledge of sale has been asserted to have gained by petitioner just after four days which does not appear to be un-natural and being prompt, there is hardly anything on file to doubt it-Petitioner has substantially performed talabs required by S. 13 and has proved those by evidence-PW 2 is not only informer giving information of sale to petitioner, but is also witness of talab-e-Muwathibat and has also signed notice of talab-e-Ishhad as its marginal witness—Other marginal witness of notice was not present at time of talab-e-Muwathibat, as such was not supposed to depose anything regarding it-Law does not require that talab-e-muwathibat be made in presence of two witnesses who should also sign notice of talab-e-Ishhad-Petitioner had performed talabs in accordance with law and as such his suit could not have been dismissed but Courts below relying on minor discrepancies which do not dispel impact of evidence of PWs, incorrectly non suited him-Respondent while appearing as witness stated that he incurred amount of as expenses for execution and completion of sale deed-His statement to this extent was not cross-examined which means that petitioner has admitted that claim of respondent-Held: Decisions of Courts below run counter to evidence on file, consequently cannot be maintained-Held further: Petitioner will pay amount as incidental charges in addition to sale price-Petition succeeds. [Pp. 1214, 1215 & 1216] A, B, C, D, E, F & G Mr. Imran Raza Chadhar, Advocate for Petitioner. Mr. Taqi Ahmad Khan, Advocate for Respondent. Date of hearing: 23.12.2003. JUDGMENT This civil revision assails the judgments and decrees dated 18.4.1994 nd 12.3.1995 passed by the learned Civil Judge and the learned Additional )istrict Judge, Daska District Sialkot, whereby, the suit of the petitioner and is appeal was dismissed, respectively. 2. Precisely, relevant facts for the disposal of this petition are that le petitioner filed a suit for possession through pre-emption against the sale Elected through a registered sale deed dated 19.12.1992 for an amount of -s. 1,75,000/- regarding land measuring 10 kanals and 2 marlas in village ihokhay Wali, Tehsil Daska District Sialkot. He pleaded that he gained nowledge of sale on 24.12.1992 and immediately exclaimed intention to ave the land in question by filling a pre-emption suit, fulfilling the jquirement of talab-e-muwathibat. The petitioner also pleaded that after :lab-e-muwathibat he issued a notice under a registered postal cover, xknowledgment due dated 24.12.1992 performing talab-e-Ishhad and lereafter he filed the suit on 8.3.1993 and performed talab-e-khasumat. The petitioner claims his superior pre-emptive right being "Shafi Khalit" and Shafi Jar" i.e. being owner of adjacent property, having joint ways and means of irrigation. 2. The respondent being defendant in the suit contested it and controverted the assertion in the plaint. He also denied performance of talabs by the petitioner and urged for dismissal of the suit. Controversial pleadings of the parties necessitated framing of issues and recording of evidence. The learned trial Judge who was seized of the matter, on the basis of his appraisal of evidence, dismissed the suit of the petitioner vide his judgment and decree dated 18.4.1994. 3. The petitioner aggrieved of the decision of the trial Court dated 18.4.1994 filed an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge but remained unsuccessful, as his appeal was dismissed vide his judgment and decree dated 12.3.1999. Thereafter he came up before this Court in revisional jurisdiction against the concurrent judgments and decrees of both the Courts below, for their annulment. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that both the talabs i.e. talab-e-muwathibat and talab-e-Ishhad were performed by the petitioner which were duly asserted by him in his plaint and were proved through evidence on the file but both the Courts have incorrectly relied on the minor discrepancy is in the statements of witnesses and non-suited the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that contradictions, if any, are of minor nature, which do not effect performance of talabs by the petitioner. He claimed that substantial compliance ol performance of talabs and discharge of onus placed on him, in accordance with the provisions of law, is evident on the face of the record but a contrary view is not sustainable. 5. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent besides supporting the judgments and decrees of the Courts below, refuted the submissions of the petitioner and urged that concurrent findings of facts delivered by the two Courts below can neither be made subject of scrutiny this Court nor re-appraisal of evidence in revisional jurisdiction, permissible under law. He further contends that contradictions noted by two Courts below, go to show that witnesses of the petitioner are no truthful and their statements cannot be based for the proposition that petitioner performed the required talabs. He further elaborates arguments by saying that witnesses of both the talabs, taiab-e-muwathiba and Talab-e-lshhad should be the same because a pre-emptor is required re-affirm the talab-e-muwathibat while making second talab, i.e. talal Ishhad. He referred; to the judgment in the case of Muhammad Ramzan vs Lai Khan (1995 SCMR 1510) Abdul Qayyurn vs. Muhammad Rafique (200 SCMR 1651) and Anwar Ali vs. Shah Nawaz and others (PLD 1989 Karachi 246. 6. I have anxiously considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the record appended herewith. The petitioner no doubt has a superior pre-emptive rights and has so been held by both the Courts below. He in order to pre-empt the sale in favour of the respondent, asserted in para 4 of the plaint that he came to know on 24.12.1992 of the sale in dispute and immediately on gaining knowledge, made a jumping demand that he will pre-empt it as his right superior, to that of the respondent and in this manner performed talab-e-muwathibat and thereafter made talab-e-Ishhad by sending a notice attested by two truthful witnesses under a registered postal cover and in this view of the matter performed talab-e-Ishhad. These assertions in the plaints were proved through his own statement as PW.l and those of PWs. 2 and 3. PW. 2 is the person who informed the petitioner regarding, the sale in dispute and he is also a witness of notice of talab-e-Ishhad (Ex. P.I). Talab-e-muwathibat was performed by the petitioner in his presence. PW. 3 is the second witnesses of notice of talab-e-Ishhad (Ex. P.I) Statements of PW.l and 2 duly proved performance of talab-e-muwathibat as asserted in the plaint and there is no contradiction or discrepancy therein irspite of lengthy cross examination to both these witnesses. Contradictions noted by the Courts below are only with regard to getting copies of the revenue record by the petitioner, after performance of talab-e-Muivathibat. Statements of PW. 1 and 2 narrating differently circumstances taking place after performance of first talab, do not wipe of their statements whereby they had consistently deposed corroborating the assertion in the plaint. At the same time these alleged discrepancies do not reflect on truthfulness of the witness who have no personal interest in the land in dispute and are not shown to be inimical to the respondent. The statements of the witnesses were recorded after lapse Df about 7 months of the sale and such minor discrepancies are bound to occur by lapse of time. Both the witnesses PWs 1 and 2 are consistent regarding,time, place, day, and manner of conveying information of sale and manner or performance of talab-e-muwathibat by the petitioner. Sale was jffected through a registered sale-deed dated 24.12.1992 and the petitioner lad asserted in his plaint that no notice in terms of Section 31 of the Punjab i're-emption Act, 1991, was given by the sub registrar concerned. The cnowledge of this sale has been asserted to have gained by the petitioner on J4.12.1992 just after four days which does not appear to be un-natural and >eing prompt, there is hardly anything on the file to doubt it. I accordingly ind that the petitioner has substantially performed talabs required by section 13 of the Punjab pre-emption Act, 1991 and has proved those by :vidence on the file. 7. Judgments in the case of Abdul Qayyum (supra) relied by the sarned counsel for the respondents goes to support the view that by larration of performance of talabs in the plaint by the pre-emptor and proof those by producing witnesses is substantial compliance of the law. The etitioner had disclosed all the material facts in the plaint and thereafter in is own statement, corroborated by the other witnesses, as such case of the espondent is not advance by reliance on this judgment of the Hon'ble upreme Court of Pakistan. In the case of Muhammad Ramzan (supra), vriowledge of the sale was asserted after a month but the Hon'ble Supreme ourt took the view that the plaintiff was deemed to have acquired nowledge of attestation of mutation of sale within two weeks. Relying on lie provisions of Section 31 of Act of 1991. In the instant case the petitioner ad asserted that notice in terms of pre-emption law, was not given and at he same time, proved knowledge of sale through registered sale-deed, just i'ter four days, is so prompt that the precedent case does not support the ubmissions of the respondent's counsel. Similarly judgment in the case of \nwar Ali (supra) lays down that pre-emptor has to make reference to his Irst demand by way of talab-e-muwathibat at the time of talab-e-Ishhad. The petitioner did mentioned in his notice Ex. P.I. that he performed talab-e-muwathibat in the presence of PW. 2 and nothing more was required to be done by him under law. 8. PW. 2 is not only a informer giving information of sale to the petitioner but is also a witness of talab-e-muwathibat and has also signed the notice of talab-e-Ishhad, as its marginal witness. Other marginal witness of the notice was not present at the time of talab-e-muwathibat, as such was not sposed to depose anything regarding it. Law does not require that talab-e-muwathibat be made in the presence of two witnesses, who should also sign the notice of talab-e-Ishhad, hence, I do find any substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that suit of the petitioner should be dismissed on the ground that the PW. 3, second witness of notice, was not present at the time of performance of talab-e-muwathibat.

9. In view of the authoritative judgment of Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Malik versus Muhammad Latif (1999 SCMR 717), Muhammad Gul vs. Muhammad Afzal (1999 SCMR 724), wherein it was held that pre-emptor who had made talab-e-muwathibat and had dispatched notice of talab-e-Ishhad within the specified time, sufficiently complied with the provisions of Section 13(3) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991, I respectfully following this dictum, hold that the petitioner had performed all the three talabs in accordance with law and as such his suit could not have been dismissed but both the Courts below relying on minor discrepancies which do not dispel the impact of evidence of the PWs, incorrectly non suited him. Hence their judgments and decrees, run counter to the evidence on the file, consequently, cannot be maintained, being tainted with material illegality and irregularity.

10. Sale subject of this suit was made through a registered sale-deed, which shows that respondent, paid entire sale price in presence of the sub registrar, at the time of its registration. Sub registrar has certified this fact in his order attesting the sale-deed. A presumption of correctness is attached to this endorsement, having been inscribed during discharge of official/statutory duties. This Court has already decided that a presumption of correctness is attached to such endorsements, in the cases of (Pirla etc. Versus Noora etc. (PLD 1976 Lahore 6), and Malik Wahid Bakhsh versus Ch. Muhammad Shaft (PLD 1976 Lahore 1069). Petitioner has asserted in his plaint that sale was, in fact, made for Rs. 1.00 Lac but he has neither produced any positive evidence in support of his this assertion nor brought any thing on the file to show that endorsement by the sub registrar over Ex. D.I was incorrect. The natural result is that property in question is proved to have been sold for Rs. 1,75,000/- actually fixed and paid to the vendor and similar findings of the Courts below on this point, are correct. 11. Respondent/vendee claimed in his written statement that he besides payment of sale price of Rs. 1,75,000/- incurred expenses on the sale-deed which in case suit of the petitioner is decreed, have to be paid to him. He while appearing as his own witness as DW. 1 stated that he incurred an amount of Rs. 25,000/- as expenses for execution and completion of the sale-deed. His statement to this extent was not cross-examined by the petitioner which means that petitioner has admitted this claim of the respondent. An uncrossed portion of witness was held to have been admitted in the case of Mst. Nur Jehan Begum through legal representatives versus Syed Mujtaba Ah Naqvi (1991 SCMR 2300) and Shah Muhammad and another versus Hafiza Begum and 2 others (2000 MLD 404). Even otherwise claim of the respondent of Rs. 25,000/- on account of incidental charges/expenses, does not appear to the exorbitant because original sale-deed Ex. D.I shows that stamp papers of the value of Rs. 10,500/- were purchased for inscribing it. Respondent must have paid some thing to its scribe and towards other taxes, like District Council Fee etc. Pre-emption being a right of substitution and as such, pre-emptor must bear all those expenses, which were incurred by vendee. It is accordingly held that petitioner will pay an amount of Rs. 25,000/- as incidental charges, in addition to the sale price.

12. For what has been discussed above this civil revision succeeds, both the judgments and decrees dated 18.4.1994 and 12.3.1995 passed by the learned Civil Judge and the learned Additional District Judge Daska District Sialkot are set aside and suit filed by the petitioner, is decreed subject to deposit by him in the trial Court an amount of Rs. 1,75,000/- plus Rs. 25,000/- (incidental charges) i.e. (Rs. 2,00,000/- (Two Lac) after deducting one third, if any, already deposited, on or before 25.2.2004 failing which his suit shall stand dismissed. This civil revision is accepted. There will be no order as to costs.

(B.T.) Petition accepted.

How conviction and sentencing is determined in narcotics case?

PLJ 2004 SC 566 [Appellate Jurisdiction] Present: SYED DEEDAR HUSSAIN SHAH AND KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMDAY, JJ. NASEER AHMAD-Petitioner versus STATE-Respondent Crl. Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 335 of 2003, decided on 14.4.2004. (On appeal from order dated 16.7.2003, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Cr.A. No. 971/1999)

Constitution of Pakistan, (1973)--—-Art. IBS-Control of Narcotic Substance, 1995 (V of 1995), S. 9(c)~ Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898), S. 164-Conviction and sentence-Appreciation of evidence-Drug trafficking-Preferred appeal dismissed by Division Bench—Assailed—On pointatioon of co-accused, ANF officials recovered 48 cartons from appellant-Private persons were not associated, because ANF official received information and apprehended co-accused and philpino woman who led raiding party to petitioner and recovery was effected-PWs fully stood and test of cross-examination and defence was not able to put any dent in prosecution story-Held: Police officials are good witness as others and their evidence on this score alone should not. be discarded-Ocular account, circumstantial evidence and confession of accused-Truthful version of

prosecution witnesses was rightly believed by trial Courts—Petition dismissed. [Pp. 568 & 569] A, B & C Dr. Khalid Ranjha, ASC with Mr. M.A. Zaidi, AOR for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondent. Date of hearing: 14.4.2004. JUDGMENT Syed Deedar Hussain Shah, J.--Petitioner seeks leave to appeal against judgment dated 16.7.2003, passed by a learned Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in Criminal Appeal No. 971 of 1999, whereby the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed and the conviction and sentence recorded by the Special Judge, Anti-Narcotics Force, Lahore, was ma ; ntained. 2. The brief prosecution story is that on the statement of Ashraf Ali, SHO, PW. 5, FIR Ex.PA/1 was registered wherein it was alleged that the officials of Anti-Narcotics Force, Lahore, received an information that a woman of Philpino origin was arrested at Islamabad Airport, who before the ANF officials disclosed that the heroin, recovered from her possession was purchased from Naseer Ahmad-petitioner, resident of Lahore. The" said woman further disclosed that other members of her gang were present in Davis Hotel, Lahore Upon receipt of such information, a raiding party headed by Lt. Col. Muhammad Younas Deputy Director, Anti Narcotics Force, raided the above Hotel and one Tajo Yahya Dantuma and Isiaka Moru were arrested. They disclosed about their co-accused Abu Bakar Garwba, Alholabisi Amori Oladihura, Alhaja Idowu Balogun, Mrs. Omolole Yemi Adlbbite and Mrs. Risikatu Leamonth, who were also arrested. All of the accused were brought by ANF officials in their office and were interrogated. During the interrogation, they admitted that there were involved in drug trafficking, and Tajo Yahya Dantma further disclosed that herein, recovered from Philpino woman at Islamabad Airport, was purchased by her from petitioner-Naseer Ahmad on payment of US $ 15,000. On his pointation, ANF official conducted raid at the house of the petitioner where his wife and children were also residing and from where 48 cartons with the labelled "Al Jabbar Associate and Electric Co. Re-conditioned Spindules Kranks Suppliers Karachi, Pakistan" were recovered and each carton contained one steel roller. The steels rollers with the help ofMistri Akhtar Ali, PW. 3 were cut down and 28 Kg heroin Ex.PE was recovered. ANF officials, after separating 15 grams as a simple, took into possession through memo Ex.PB, which apart from I.O. was attested by Hawaldar Sher Zaman, PW. 2 The report of the Chemical Examiner was obtained, which was in positive. 3. After usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the petitioner alongwith co-accused before the trial Court, who convicted the petitioner under Section 9(c) of CNSO. 1995 and sentenced to death. On appeal, the learned Division Bench of the High Court maintained the

conviction and sentence, as awarded by the learned trial Court and dismissed the appeal of the petitioner. Hence, this petition. 4. Dr. Khalid Ranjha, learned counsel for the petitioner, inter alia, contended that the learned High Court had not considered the case in its proper perspective; that contraband narcotics were not produced before the trial Court and the alleged judicial confession of the petitioner under Section 164 Cr.P.C., recorded by the Magistrate was not in consonance with the High Court Rules and Orders; that the prosecution violated the provisions of Section 103 Cr.P.C. as private persons were not associated in the recovery process by the prosecution; and that the co-accused were convicted by the learned trial Court and lenient view in their conviction was taken. 5. We Have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and carefully examined the available material. The petitioner was implicated by Philpino woman, who disclosed that she had purchased the narcotics from him. Furthermore, on her disclosure, other members of the gang were arrested from a Hotel at Lahore, who also disclosed the involvement of the petitioner. From the record, it is not born out that co-accused, or officials of the ANF had any ill-will, prejudice and malice against the petitioner; so that he could have been falsely implicated in the case. On the pointation and disclosure of Tajo Yahya Dantuma raid was conducted at the house of petitioner, who also disclosed that heroin was purchased by Philpino lady from him for an amount of US $ 15,000/- and further that the raiding party recovered a huge quantity of heroin from the house of the petitioner. So far as the non-production of the narcotics before the trial Court is concerned, the I.O. during the trial submitted an application under Section 516 Cr.P.C. for destruction of narcotics substance, which was allowed by the Magistrate on 4.12.1995 and the Destruction Certificate was issued by the Magistrate on 5.12.1995. We are mindful of the fact that during the trial, the petitioner did not raise objection for the Destruction of the narcotics under the valid orders of the Court. 6. We have also gone through the statement of the petitioner under Section 164 Cr.P.C. recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, which is quite in accordance with the law and the High Court Rules. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the private persons were not associated in the seizing of narcotics, is not tenable, because ANF officials received the information and apprehended Philpino woman and co-accused who led the raiding party to the house of the petitioner and recovery was effected, which was attested by Hawaldar Sher Zaman and I.O. These PWs as well as other PWs have fully stood the test of cross-examination and defence was not able to put any dent in the prosecution case. It has been held by this Court, time and again that the police officials are as good witnesses as others, and their evidence on this score alone should not be discarded. Now-a-days, drug trafficking has created dangerous problems for the society and

the country at large. This menace should be curhed so that people in society could get relief. 7. We further find that the trial Court as well as the learned appellate Court after thorough and careful examination found that the prosecution has proved the case against the petitioner beyond reasonable shadow of doubt. 8. No doubt, the co-accused were awarded lesser sentence i.e. 10 years R.I., but the main role of purchase, sale, and storing the narcotics is attributed to the petitioner, which shows that he is the ring leader of the smugglers gang. Therefore, keeping in view the ocular account, circumstantial evidence and confession of the petitioner, the truthful version of the prosecution witnesses was rightly believed by the trial Court and upheld by the learned High Court. 9. The impugned judgment is well reasoned and is based on the proper appreciation of facts and law. Neither there is jurisdictional error nor misconstruction of law. 10. For the facts, circumstances and reasons stated hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that the petition is without merit and substance, which is hereby dismissed and leave refused. (A.A.K.) Petition dismissed.

Police is not possessed with the right to murder anyone

PLJ 2000 Peshawar 3 (DB) Present: MIAN SHAKAR ULLAH JAN AND talaat qayyum qureshi, JJ. Mst. MALKA JAN-Petitioner

Versus

I.G. POLICE NWFP PESHAWAR and 2 others-Respondents

W.P. No. 137 of 1997, decided on 19.8.1999.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-

—S. 154-F.I.R.-Registration of--Prayer for-Offence U/S. 302 Pakistan Penal Code, 1860~Two version casc--A police muqabala case-Filing a writ petition by deceased's mother after one month for registration of murder case against police—Petitioner who is mother of deceased has charged various police officers and attributed specific roles to them for urder of her son-Police is not possessed with right to murder or kill or take life of any citizen accused of any offence only for reason that such person was involved in criminal cases and keeps a previous bad record- No body even police can be allowed to take law into bis hands and it is uty of Courts to Curb high-handedness sternly-In view of attending circumstances of case police is under a statutory duty to reduce into writing information given to him by petitioner of commission of a cognizable offence as provided by Section 154 Cr.P.C.--Version on basis .I.R. of Police muqabala has already been registered is distinct whereas version given by petitioner is totally on different premises, that s n of petitioner lady was murdered by police officials named in writ petition- Truth can be ascertained only if versions of two sides are placed only before Court-Petition accepted and police is directed to register a case in accordance with Section 154 Cr.P.C. on information being given to him by petitioner of a cognizable offence. [Pp. 12 & 13] E, F & G Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-

—S. 154 & 190 FIR and Private complainant-In order to set criminal law into motion two modes have been provided in Criminal Procedure Code; one by way of lodging of report with police under Section 154 Cr.P.C. in respect of commission of cognizable offence and other by filing of a complaint before Magistrate as provided by Section 190 of Code of Criminal Procedure. [P. 6] A Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--—S. 155~Non-cognizable case-So far as non-cognizable offence is concerned, Section 155 Cr.P.C. provides that substance of such information shall be entered in a book to be kept for such purpose and informant is to be referred to Magistrate-It is further provided that no Police Officer shall investigate in non-cognizable case without order of Magistrate having power to try such case-After receiving such order from Magistrate, Police Officer can investigate case and may exercise powers in same way as in cognizable case. [P. 7] B Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--—S. 154-F.I.R.~Registration of-Requirement of law is that Police Officer has to record FIR mandatorily of a cognizable case under Section 54 Cr.P.C. but if it is a non-cognizable case then substance of such information is to be entered in relevant register but in each case refusal is out of question~The Incharge of a Police Station is duty bound and it is his statutory obligation that on receipt of information whether orally or in riting he has to record same in book prescribed for that purpose and no option or discretion is left with him in this regard. [P. 7] C Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--—S. 154--F.I.R. lodging of-Two versions~Case~If a distinct and separate cognizable offence is disclosed and no effective inquiry or trial can be held without properly appreciating and considering two versions then another F.I.R. is to be registered. [P. 12] D Mr. Muhammad Aslam Uns, Advocate for Petitioner. Qazi Muhammad Ghazanfar, AAG for State. Date of hearing: 23.6.1999. judgment Talaat Qayyum Qureshi, J.--6rief facts given in the writ petition in hand are that on report of one Waris Khan son of Muhammad Rafique who is real brother of Muhammad Muzaffar Khan Inspector of local police, a case under Section 11/16 Offences of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 was registered against Muhammad Akhtar on 8.8.1996 vide F.I.R. No. 6, in Police Station Abbottabad alleging therein that Muhammad Akhtar had abducted Mst. Saiqa his niece and daughter of Muhammad Muzaffar Khan. Mst. Saiqa Bibi, the alleged abductee, being sui juris contracted marriage of her own free will with Muhammad Akhtar on 12.8.1996 and the spouses started living together with complete harmony in village Sheikhul Bandi District Abbottabad. This marriage had been contracted by Mst. Saiqa Bibi independent of her parents. They were not consulted prior to solemnization of the said marriage nor their consent was obtained thereafter, which nourished grudge against Muhammad Akhtar. The father of Mst. Saiqa Bibi namely, Muhammad Muzaffar Khan Inspector Police NWFP who was inimical towards Muhammad Akhtar deceased for having abducted his daughter and solemnized marriage with her without his consent was in chase to take revenge from him. He managed to get Muhammad Akhtar killed, conspired with Head Constable Iqrar and Muhammad Arif F.C. who in pre-planned manner after due deliberation on 14.3.1997 while Muhammad Akhtar deceased was going to offer Jumma Prayers and had hardly reached near Mosque, Muhammad Iqrar Head Constable opened fire at him which hit him and as a result of which he died on the spot Muhammad Arif F.C. was also firing in the air to keep the people away. Later on, this incident was given the name of "POLICE MUQABALA* and a case vide F.I.R. No. 307 was also registered on 14.3.1997 in Police Station Cantt. Abbottabad and in this way it was endavoured to put a veil on the police action to save the skin of police officials and avoid possible re-action from general public. The matter did not end there, the police party after murdering Muhammad Akhtar deceased went to his house, violated the privacy and took away the jewellery and other articles from the house. 2. The petitioner who is aged mother of deceased Muhammad Akhtar as well as both his wives voiced against high-handedness of olice, approached many times to concerned authorities to register a case against those who had killed the deceased but to no avail, hence she sought the help of local press through which they made the high ups known of the extra judicial killing by the police officials. They also made sympathetic appeal to the worthy Chief Minister, NWFP of judicial inquiry into the gruesome murder of deceased and also beseeched that the police was after them and their lives were in eminent danger but no action was taken by the authorities which necessitated in filing the present writ petition seeking the direction of this Court in the name of SHO, P.S. Cantt: Abbottabad to register a case against the culprits.

3. Mr. Muhammad Aslam Uns Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that fundamental rights as envisaged in Article 25 f the Constitution, to be treated in accordance with law or to be entitled to equal protection of law, have been violated by respondents. It is the duty of the Officer In-charge of Police Station to register a case on receipt of information that a cognizable offence has been committed. The S.H.O. P.S. Cantt: Abbottabad, Respondent No. 2 failed to discharge his duty in accordance with law. He further argued that the petitioner not only approached Respondent No. 2 many a times to register a case for the murder of her son but approached Respondent No. 1, the worthy Chief Minister and other high ps through the help of press but no action was taken on her request. After the publication of news in all the local Newspapers, the concerned authorities were well aware of the incident but they failed to act in accordance with law. He placed reliance on "Mst. Ghanwa Bhutto and another vs. Government of Sindh and another" PLD 1997 Karachi 119 and "Saleem Sarwar vs. SHO, P.S. Head Marala and two others" PLJ 1984 Cr. Cases (Lahore) 369 and prayed that direction he issued to register a case against the real culprits. 4. Qazi Muhammad Ghazanfar A.A.G. firmly resisted the writ petition. He argued that the petitioner had adequate remedy in form of private complaint available to her which she did not avail. If the police authorities did not register a case on her request she could easily file a private complaint in the Competent Court of law. He further argued that fter the occurrence the petitioner kept mum for about a month and thereafter raised hue and cry in the press. He stated that the press clippings annexed with the writ petition are not admissible. Neither any report in writing was submitted to the S.H.O. concerned nor she ever approached him for registration of the case. The deceased Muhammad Akhtar was not a law abiding citizen but was a proclaimed offender. He was involved in case FIR No. 56 registered on 8.8.1996 under Sections 11/16 of Zinc Ordinance, FIR No. 322 dated 7.8.1994 U/Ss. 11/16/5/10 Zina Ordinance in P.S. Havelian and FIR No. 51 dated 14.2.1995 U/Ss. 452/506/34 PPC, in P.S. Nawanshehr and his history sheet No. 18/APO has also been opened. On the day f occurrence he alongwith his co-accused Sohrab proclaimed offender and Arshad fired at the police party headed by Muhammad Iqrar of P.S. Cantt; in village Sheikhul Bandi. The police party in their defence also opened fire with the result Muhammad Akhtar sustained injuries and died on the spot while his co-accused succeeded in decamping from the spot. After his death one rifle 222 bore, two pistols 30 bore, dagger, 7 magazine and 110 cartridges were found lying near his dead body and were secured by the police. The deceased died in an encounter with police and Muhammad Zaffar Khan Inspector who was posted as Traffic Inspector at Mansehra had no concern with such police encounter. He further argued that F.I.R. No. 307 has already been registered on 14.3.1997 under Section 324/353/224 /34 PPC and 13 A.O. and second F.I.R. regarding the same incident cannot be registered.

5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length.

6. In order to set the criminal law into motion two modes have been provided in the Criminal Procedure Code; one by way of lodging of eport with the police under Section 154 Cr.P.C. in respect of commission of cognizable offence and the other by filing of a complaint before Magistrate as provided by Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

7. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that substance of every information relating to the commission of a ognizable offence if given to an Officer Incharge of a Police Station shall be entered in a book to be kept by such Officer in such form as the Provincial Government may prescribed in this behalf. So far as non-cognizable offence is concerned, Section 155 Cr.P.C. provides that substance of such information shall be entered in a book to be kept for such purpose and informant is to be referred to the Magistrate. It is further provided that no Police Officer shall investigate in non-cognizable case without order of the Magistrate having power to try such case. After receiving such order from Magistrate, Police Officer can investigate the case and may exercise powers in the same way as in cognizable case. Section 156 Cr.P.C. empowers the incharge of a Police Station to investigate cognizable cases whereas Section 157 Cr.P.C. lays down that on receiving information with regard to commission of a cognizable offence which a Police Officer is competent to investigate, report is to be sent immediately to Magistrate empowered in that behalf and to take necessary steps for discovery and arrest of offender. If the Officer Incharge of Police Station under proviso-B to Section 157(1) and sub-section (2) to Section 157 Cr.P.C. is of the view that there is no sufficient ground to conduct the investigation, he after recording reasons to that effect in the report can decline to investigate but it is mandatory for him to notify the information about the fact that he would not investigate the case or that the same will not be investigated. Section 159 Cr.P.C. lays down that on receipt of such a report by Magistrate under Section 157 Cr.P.C.,' he may determine either not to proceed further or he may take cognizance of the offence as provided under Section 190(l)(b) Cr.P.C. or under Section 203 Cr.P.C. Similarly, Section 169 Cr.P.C. empowers the Incharge of a Police Station to release to the accused in deficient evidence on his won bond or with or without sureties for his appearance when-ever he is required. Section 170(1) Cr.P.C. provides that upon investigation if there is sufficient evidence the Incharge of Police Station would forward the accused to Magistrate. Section 173 Cr.P.C. envisages that Incharge of Police Station is required to submit a final report after the completion of investigation containing the complete result of investigation conducted in the case and action taken in respect of informant before the Magistrate, competent to take cognizance in the case.

8. The perusal of the above mentioned sections of law clearly show that the requirement of law is that Police Officer has to record the FIR mandatorily of a cognizable case under Section 154 Cr.P.C. but if it is a non-cognizable case then substance of such information is to be entered in the relevant register but in each case the refusal is out of question. The Incharge of a Police Station is duty bound and it is his statutory obligation that on receipt of information whether orally or in writing he has to record the same in the book prescribed for that purpose and no option or discretion is left with him in this regard.

9. On receipt of a complaint the Magistrate, as provided by Section 190 of Code of Criminal Procedure may take cognizance of an offence. The Magistrate is empowered to take the cognizance of the offence under Section 200 Cr.P.C. On filing of complaint in Court, he shall at once examine the complainant on oath and the substance of the examination shall be reduced to writing. Section 202 Cr.P.C. further empowers such Magistrate to postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of person complained against and to either inquire into the case himself or to direct an inquiry or investigation to be made by any Justice of Peace or Police Officer or by such other persons as he thinks fit for the purpose for ascertaining the truth of falsehood of the complaint.

10. No doubt the above mentioned remedies are parallel and remedy by way of private complaint is equally effective practical and adequate remedy as has been held in the following cases: -"High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is not obliged to issue directions for registration of F.I.R. in each case. Issuance of such a direction, however, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case as to whether such direction could be issued to meet the ends of justice or availability of an alternate remedy by way of filing a direct complaint would be considered as adequate and prper remedy for declining such relief." (2) "Jamsheed Ahmed v. Muhammad Akram and another" 1975 SCMR 149. "The petition could be thrown out on the short ground that the High Court was under no obligation to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioner. It was a matter entirely in its discretion and there is nothing to indicate that it was improperly exercised. Even otherwise, by no means does the impugned order shut the door on the petitioner who is at liberty to initiate criminal proceedings by lodging a complaint." (3) "Haji Muhammad Khan v. Ch, Khizar Hayat and 3 others" PLD 1997 Lah, 424. "The principle of law that has been enunciated in the Intra-Court Appeal No. 31 of 1976 is, however, unexceptionable. The exercise of power under Article 199 of the Constitution is subject to the condition that there is no adequate remedy provided by law. Such an adequate remedy is provided to a complainant under Section 190 read with Sections 200 to 203, Cr.P.C. Section 190 provides that a Magistrate may take cognizance upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitutes such offence. The procedure for dealing with such complaints is provided in Sections 200 to 203 Cr.P.C. There may be cases where the evidence to prove the commission of an offence cannot be collected except through the police agency. Similarly, there may be cases where the entire evidence to prove the commission of such offence is with the complainant. In the second category of cases it cannot be doubted that the complaint before the Magistrate is an adequate remedy. In such case the High Court refuses to exercise in writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The advisability of exercising a discretion in favour a petitioner can be considered only in a case where the evidence can be collected through the agency of the police." (4) "Wazir Ahmad v. SHO, Police Station Maboob Kaldhoro and others" 1990 PCr.L.J. 2006.

"The relief under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, being discretionary relief, the writ cannot be issued as of right or in routine. In order to seek a relief of this nature, a petitioner must come to Court with clean hands and if he is ground to have suppressed a material fact such relief should be refused." (5) "Altaf Hussain vs. Government of Sindh through Home Secretary, Government of Sindh, Karachi an another" PLD 1997 Kar. 600. "The cases referred to by us in this judgment, therefore, leave no doubt that whenever an adequate remedy in the form of a private complaint is available to the petitioner, relief sought by him in the petition may be declined to him. In the present case, the petitioner could have filed a private complaint before the Court having jurisdiction in the matter in case the complaint sent by him to the police was not registered or he was dissatisfied with the investigation of the case, carried out by the former, apart from the foreign, when information is received by a Police Officer Incharge of a police station regarding the allegations must be found by him to be prima facie correct before an F.I.R. is registered. But where allegations are made, which, without making an elaborate investigation into them, are found hard to believe, provisions of Section 154, Cr.P.C., may not be attracted in such case. Therefore, the question, whether discretion must be exercised in favour of a party, in a even case, and direction must be given to a Police Officer to register an F.I.R. would depend upon the circumstances of each case. So far as the contention that alternate remedy must equally be an effacious remedy is concerned, suffice it to say that, a private complaint can provide an equally adequate relief to the complaint, because he can lead the entire evidence himself before the Court. It would, therefore, be erroneous to assume that grievance of the petitioner cannot be adequately redressed by filing of a private complaint. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the directions sought by the petitioner in the present case need not be given by us to the respondents." 11. The only fact that the aggrieved patty has an alternate remedy of filing a private complaint would not take away the discretion of this and deter the Court from giving directions to the police to record an F.I.R. in an appropriate case. According to the principles laid down by superior Courts the discretionary powers must be exercised in good faith having regard to all relevant considerations and it should be exercised justly, fairly and reasonably. 12. It was argued by the learned A.A.G. that since F.I.R. No. 307 has already been registered on 14.3.1997 under Section 324/353/224/34 PPC and 13 A.O., second F.I.R. regarding the same incident cannot be registered. Before examining this point, with the reference to the facts and circumstances of this case it will be proper to discuss and examine some relevant case on the subject. In a case "Akram All Shah vs. SHO, P.S. and two others" PLJ 1976 Cr.C. (Lahore) 53 it was held, "It cannot be laid down as a proposition of the law that if one F.I.R. pertaining to a criminal occurrence has been registered then another F.I.R. containing the counter version of the same occurrence cannot or not be registered." 13. Similarly, a Division Bench of Lahore High Court in case "Abdul Ghani vs. S.H.O. P.S. Saddar" NLR 1982 Cr. 296 held,-"I am of the view that in attending circumstances of the case in hand, the respondent SHO is under a statutory duty to reduce into writing the information given to him by the petitioner of commission of a cognizance offence as provided by Section 154 Cr.P.C." Likewise in a case "Haleem Sarwar vs. SHO, P.S. Head Marala and two others" PLJ 1984 Cr.C. (Lahore) 369 it was held, "On a review of the case law reproduced above, and the facts of the case as emerged from the record, the petitioner has a clear grievance against the police. If as alleged, the matter was reported to the police first in point of time and the substance of information disclosed commission of a cognizable offence, then the S.H.O. could not refuse to register a formal FIR for it was his duty to record the information and proceed to investigate the matter as provided in Section 154 Cr.P.C. Even if an FIR has been registered on the basis of one sided version, registration of a second FIR showing a different grievance could not be refused by the Police Officer in proper performance of his legal duty under Section 154 Cr.P.C."

Similarly, in an other case titled "Mrs. Ghanwa Bhutto and another vs. Government of Sindh and another" PLD 1997 Karachi 119 it was observed,

"Turning now, to the facts of the present case, there is no controversy in respect of the fact that two reports in respect of the said occurrence have already been registered by the police and in the second report registered at the instance of Asghar All, the servant of the first petitioner, police officers have been charged with murder of Mir Murtaza Bhutto. No doubt, as has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code postulates registration of only one F.I.R. in respect of an offence and in any case an F.I.R. including commission of Qatl-e-Amd has already been registered at the instance of said servant of the first petitioner-Even the F.I.R. registered at the instance of Station House Officer, Haq Nawaz Sial, according to the respondents' counsel, was sufficient to se the criminal law into motion. Therefore, is registration of a third F.I.R. warranted under the law? The circumstances of the present case, however, indicate that while the first F.I.R. was registered at the instance of a police officer who was suspected of being an accused himself in the case by the petitioners, the second F.I.R. was registered at the instance of Asghar Ali, the private servant of Petitioner No. 1, after four days of the occurrence when he was still in the custody of the police. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that the two F.I.Rs. registered by the police do not reflect the true facts of the case, does not appear to be unreasonable. It is also pertinent to point out that the petitioners wanted to name certain police officers as some of the culprits, who, according to the petitioners, had participated in the said crime and definite role has been attributed to them in the proposed F.I.R. Therefore, a prima facie case appears to have been made out against the said person for the purpose of recording an F.I.R. However, some other police officers have been named as suspects but no definite role has been attributed to them by the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioners have failed to satisfy the conscience of the Court so far as the said police officers are concerned. We are, therefore, firmly of the view that circumstances of the present case are distinguishable from those of the cases earlier decided by this Court, reference to which is made in this judgment."

Yet in another case "Muhammad Anwar Sub-Inspector, Railway Police Lahore vs. S.H.O. Railway Police Kasur and 2 others" PLD 1999 Lahore 50 it was held,

"The crux of the matter which boils down after doing through all the cited cases is that if counter-version is merely restricted to a defence version, the second version or a different version of incident, second F.I.R. cannot be recorded. But if a distinct and separate cognizance offence is disclosed and no effective inquiry or trial can be held without properly appreciating and considering the two versions, then another F.I.R. is to be recorded. I am, therefore, of the view that the respondents have illegally refused to register the case. The are, therefore, directed to register the F.I.R. and thereafter, to conduct the investigation therein."

Similarly, in case titled "Jamshed Khan and another vs. Government ofSindh and others" 1999 P.O.L.J. 512 it was held,

"Thus, it is obvious that looking towards the facts and circumstances of a particular case not only second but even third F.I.R. could be registered."

14. The above discussion would lead us to the conclusion that "if a distinct and separate cognizable offence is disclosed and no effective nquiry or trial can be held without properly appreciating and considering the two versions then another F.I.R. is to be registered.

15. In the case in hand the police officials declared the occurrence as police encounter and registered F.I.R. No. 307 on 14.3.1997 hereas the etitioner who is mother of the deceased has charged various police officers and attributed specific roles to them for murder of her son. The Constitution of Pakistan safe guards a against breach of his fundamental rights, they also stand controlled and governed by the provisions of law against breach of their rights and are also safe guarded against certain wrongs. The police is not possessed with right to murder or kill or take life of any citizen accused of any offence only for the reason that such person was involved in criminal cases and keeps a previous bad record. A person keeping bad record may be innocent in the case registered against him because under the law presumption of innocence will continue until he is proved guilty. If the police machinery takes law in their hands they are to be dealt with in the same manner as the ordinary citizen are dealt with. Nobody can be allowed to take law into his hands and it is the duty of the Courts to curb the high handedness sternly.

16. aving given consideration to the controversy involved, we are of the view that in the attending circumstances of the case in hand, the Respondent No. 2, S.H.O. P.S. Cantfc Abbottabad is under a statutory duty to reduce into writing the information given to him by the petitioner f the commission of a cognizable offence as provided by Section 154 Cr.P.C. Needless to mention that if in the course of investigation he comes to conclusion that information given by the petitioner is false he can have a recourse to the law. The version on the basis of which F.I.R. No. 307 has already been registered on 14.3.1997 is distinct whereas the version given by the petitioner is totally on different premises that her son, the deceased, was murdered by Police Officials named in the writ petition. At this stage we cannot hold as to which version is correct but truth can be ascertained only if the case of the petitioner is registered and both the cases are investigated upon together and thereafter report or reports are submitted by the Investigating Agency. Unless both the versions are placed before the Court no proper adjudication of the respective contentions could be made to submit challan in one case and to ignore the version given in any other is not at all conducive to the interest of justice. 17. In view of the above discussion this writ petition is accepted. Respondent No. 2 S.H.O. P.S. Cantt: Abbottabad is directed to register a case in accordance with Section 154 Cr.P.C. on the information being given to him by the petitioner of a cognizable offence and the investigation of the case be entrusted to an experienced, and honest police official. The petitioner is directed to approach the Respondent No. 2 for registration of the case. (K.K.F.) Orders accordingly.

What is the concept of bonded labor?

PLJ 1990 SC 216 [Original Jurisdiction] Present: MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAI i, JAVED IQBAL AND S USMAN ALI SHAH, J J DARSHAN MASIH alias REHMATAY and others-Petitioners versus THE STATE-Respondent Constitution Case No. 1 of 1988, decided on 15-3-1989

(i) Bonded Labour--—Brick-kiln owners and labourers—Disputes between—Solution of—Future pesligis—Grant and recovery of—Procedure for—Peshgis system in future is to be discontinued-Held: If a valid agreement on this point is reached between a labourer and an owner, an advance loan not exceeding seven day's wages can be given payment/adjustment whereof will be made to owner in easy instalments as agreed by parties. [Pp. 238&239]C

(ii) Bonded Labour--—Brick-kiln owners and labourers—Disputes between—Solution of— Jamadar/Jamadarni system—Finishing of—Held: Existing Jamadar/Jamadarni system is to cease forthwith-Held further: All labourers shall have direct dealings with owners and no payment on their behalf shall be made to Jamadars/Jamadarnis. [P. 239JF (iii) Bonded Labour--—Brick-kiln owners and labourers-Disputes between-Solution of--Past peshgis-Recovery of-Method for-Past unreturned peshgis given to labourers by brick-kiln owners still outstanding-Labourers are legally bound to return all such peshgis-Held: In case of denial of peaceful return of those peshgis, owners are authorised to recover same by legal means, i.e. court decrees, but they are not authorised to use unlawful means such as coercive methods or use of Police. [P. 238]A (iv) Bonded Labour——Brick-kiln owners and labourers—Disputes between—Solution of—Past special emergency loans-Recovery of-Held: A maximum of Rs. 5000/- per household granted in past as formal loans or grants for marriages, religious festivals, medical treatment and death ceremonies by owners, shall not be recoverable and shall be treated as donation to those labourers who return and resume work voluntarily. [P.238JB (v) Bonded Labour——Brick-kiln owners and labourers-Disputes between-Solution of-Payment of wages—Procedure for—Held: Payment of wages shall have to be made to labourers on daily/weekly/fortnightly/monthly basis as agreed upon between labourer and Bhatta owner-Held further: No deductions are to be made from their wages for damage/losses to bricks caused by rain and same shall be borne by Bhatta owners. [P. 239] E (vi) Bonded Labour--—Brick-kiln owners and labourers-Disputes belwccn--So)ution oi-Return of labourers to work—Procedure for—A notice/direction is to be issued to all labourers to come for work and report to their respective Bhatta owners who will give assurance in writing that they will not use any coercive methods or use police force to bring them back or retain them—Held: A labourer who does not want to come back or having returned, wants to leave work in Bhatta of existing owner or to get job elsewhere or in Bhatta of another owner, shall not be retained forcibly provided he gets a certificate for this purpose from concerned District Judge/Civil Judge 1st Class—Held further: Retention shall not be treated as detention and labourers shall not be retained in any manner which is otherwise unlawful.[Pp. 239&241JD&H (vii) Bonded Labour-—Loans in form of pesligis-Rccovvry of-Future loans-Prohibition of-Whether enactment of new provisions is necessary-Question of-Enquiry, though limited, has revealed that individual young people, by selling their properties and/or by earnings from abroad through similar labour, advanced loans to Bhatta labour in lacs of rupees-Labourers fled away treating it astheir right neither to work nor to return money—Mr. Ihsanullah and his Union insisted till end ui.it it is ihcir right to do so as according to Indian Law, amount could be appropriated on account of what he thought philosophy underlying practice of bonded labour-Held: His view, if made a law in Pakistan, an Islamic State, it is likely to fail—Held further: Contracts whether of loans or of work should be tested on touchstone of Contract Act which already contains enough strong safeguards against illegal, immoral, unconscionable and other similar contracts and those against public policy. [Pp. 243&244]P PLJ 1988 SC 306 = PLD 1988 SC 416 and PLJ 1990 SC 139 rel. AIR 1984 SC (India) 1099 and 802 ref. (viii) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--—-Art. 184(3) read with Articles 199(l)(c), 187, 189 and 190-Orders to be passed under Art. 184(3)-Nature of-Jurisdiction of Supreme Court-Sometimes Supreme Court has to satisfy dictates of "complete justice" as its judgment is subject of ample authority as well as of future application in given cases-Held: When this power is exercised, Court will have necessary additional power to "issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary"~Held further: Besides binding effect of judgment/order of Supreme Court on all other courts, question of law or principle of law enunciated by it is a similar command to all executive and judicial authorities throughout Pakistan, hence Supreme Court, in a fit case of enforcement of Fundamental Rights, has jurisdiction, power and competence to pass all proper/necessary orders as facts justify. [P. 242]M (ix) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--—-Art. 184(3)-Orders to be passed under Art. 184(3)~Nature of~Nature of orders which can be passed in such cases, is also indicated in Article 184(3), that is , such as can be passed under Article 199-HeId: Even if it is assumed that nature of order is confined only to orders under sub-clause (c) of Article 191(1) and not to other orders under Article 199, any concievable just and proper order can be passed in a case like present one-Held further: Principle of extension involved in relevant phrase used in Art. 199(l)(c) "an order givingsuch directions to any person or authority as may be appropriate forenforcement of " cannot be abridged or curtailed by law. [P. 242]L (x) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973——Art. 184(3)--Telegram to Chief Justice—Whether can be made basis for action-Question of-Under Article 184(3), without prejudice to provisions of Art. 199, Supreme Court, in a question of public importance with reference to enforcement of Fundamental Rights, has power to make an order of nature mentioned in said Article-Held: Acceptance of a telegram in this case is covered by Miss Benazir Bhutto's case as also by due extension of principles laid therein-Held further: Such information through telegrams and letters, even if addressed to individual Judges, has to go to Hon'ble Chief Justice for initiation of proceedings. [Pp. 241&242JJ&KPLJ 1988 SC 306=PLD 1988 SC 416 rel—Forced labour—Expression of—Definition of—Necessity of—For purposes of convenience of all concerned, it might be necessary to define expression "forced labour" with illustrations of iis different forms to minimise any confusion about its real purport as also resultant unproductive litigation—For this purpose, other elements in these Fundamental Rights may be collected together and put in a self contained code—It might cover all aspects of human dignity, deprivations and misery including those rights in this behalf enshrined in Islam—Held: These aspects of enforcement of Fundamental Rights guaranteed in Constitution and other basic human rights ensured by Islam, can, by law, be made also into an independent inalienable right with self operating mechanism for its enforcement as well. [P. 243JN&O (xii) Practice and Procedure--—Deciding of an issue—Strict legal principles of—Adherence to—There is great merit in Court proceeding to decide an issue on basis of strict legal principles and avoiding carefully influence of purely emotional appeal—Certainty of substance and certainty of direction are indispensable requirements in development of law and invest it with credibility which commands public confidence in its legitimacy—Held: This warning is of especial significance in this phase of judicial history when a few social action groups tend to show evidence of presuming that in every case, Court must bend and mould its decision to popular notions of which way a case should be decided. [P.245]Q&R AIR 1984 SC (India) 802 ref. Mr KJwlil Ramdey, Advocate General and Mr. Tanvir Ahmad KJian, Addl. Advocate General for State. Mr Abdul Sattar Najam and Mrs Asrna Jeliangir, Advocates, representatives of the High Court Bar Association. Mr. Zainul Abidin, Advoate for Bhatta owners. Mr KJialidMahmood, Advocate for Labourers. Dates of hearing: 11,12,13,14 and 15-3-1989. ORDER Muhammad Afzal Zullah, J.--On 30th July, 1988 during the long summer vacations the following telegram was received by the Honourable Chief Justice of Supreme Court."Chief Justice Supreme Court of Pakistan, Rawalpindi. We plead for protection and bread for our family. We are brick kiln bonded labourers. We have been set at liberty through the Court. And now three amongst us have been abducted by our owners. Our children and women are living in danger. We have filed complaint. No action taken. We are hiding like animals without protection or food. We are afraid and Hungry. Please help us. We can be contacted through counsel Asma Jehangir. Our state can be inspected. We want to live like human beings. The law gives no protection to us.Darshan Masih (Rehmatay) and 20 companions with women and children main market Gulberg, Lahore."The same day it was marked to me. A Bench with myself as a Member was then functioning at Lahore. On the receipt of the telegram by me at Lahore it was, prima-facie, considered to be a case falling in the category of public interest litigation and direct cognizance by the Supreme Court under Article 184 of the Constitution, was possible. As it was the first case of its nature, while treating the matter in Chambers, it was necessary to seek assistance of the Bar on the legal side and the police, for the purpose of the release of the detenues who, it appeared prima-facie from the telegram, were the bonded labourers in the brick Kiln Industry. The following order was accordingly passed:-"Malik Abdul Karim, President cf Lahore High Court Bar Association be requested io assign a senior member of the Bar on the criminal side to handle the case.In the meanwhile ihe office to trace out the case marked 'A' in the telegram.A copy of the telegram and this order be immediatlely taken to I.G. Punjab peisocally by an official of the Court for a very prompt action; in accordance with law and report."Although the Order was taken personally io the I.G. Police by an official of the Court as a mark of urgency to impress upon him for personal immediate attention, he sent it down to the D.LG. Police who in turn sent it down to the lower staff; and ultimately, during the subsequent detailed inquiry it was discovered that a copy of the Supreme Court directive had reached Bhatta owner concerned. He obviously took all precautionary measures so as to avoid serious consequences. Be that as it may, a D.I.G. reported that "a case under sections 406/420 PPC was reigstered at pc4ke station Bhai Pheru, District Kasur, against Boota Masih and 20 others on the complaint of Malik Abdul Qayyum, for an alleged criminal breach of trust. The accused reportedly received four lacs in advance as labour charges for manufacturing raw bricks; but slipped away alongwith advance money. Boota Masih and 13 others have been arrested." The President Bar Association deputed a senior Member of the Bar who had also been a Government Law Officer (Assistant Advocate General). He also made preliminary inquiries through the sources of the Bar. The accused persons were ordered to be produded before the Court. However, as the matter was being dealt by a Magistrate 1st Class under the Criminal Procedure Code, after the afore noticed arrest of the persons concerned, it was not considered appropriate in the circumstances of the case to pass direct orders of release; particularly because the Police itself offered that they would themselves get them released on bail. -Some persons out of the total mentioned in the telegram were stated to be not available nor they had been arrested. After a detailed preliminary discussion with all concerned the following Order was passed:-"This matter has come up for further examination after prima facie satisfaction through preliminary inquiries that the complaint is bonafide.""The concerned police officials including Muhammad Ashraf, DSP, Pattoki, are present. The learned Advocate-General has appeared to assist as Senior Officer of the Court. He has with him his own team including Mr. Tanvir Ahmad, Additional-Advocate-General. Mr. AbdusSattar Najam, as ex-Law Officer (Assistant Advocate-General), who has been assigned the duty to assist the Court in this matter in pursuance of the request sent to the President of the Bar Association in this behalf. Mrs. Asma Jehangir, a local Lawyer, is assisting Mr. Najam. One Mst. Bashiran, who claims to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances in which the complaint was made to the Supreme Court, is assisting this team of Lawyers."The DSP has stated that a criminal case having been registered in respect of the subject matter of the complaint, 21 persons (all adult males) were required by the Police for investigation; 14 of them having already been arrested as accused, 11 were bailed out in accordance with law. They are all present in Court and have stated that they are no more under detention. Three persons have appeared in custody. The DSP stated that excepting Sadiq Masih, who is in custody under judicial orders, the remaining two are going to be released by him to-day on personal bonds and on furnishing of surety bonds by one Yasin, who is present in Court and is stated to be the present employer of all the detenus and their companions. Regarding the remaining seven persons, after obtaining time from the Court, the DSP has made a statement that to the best of his satisfaction they are not in any form of illegal detention. According to him they have concealed themselves out of fear of arrest by the police in the case which has already been registered. He further stated that Sadiq, Allah Ditta, Boota and Rehmat, who are present (out of the alleged detenus) have assured him (the DSP) that the remaining seven persons would appear before the DSP as soon as possible because, as stated, they are no more now under the fear of any illegal treatement. On their assurance, the DSP, in turn, has assured the Court that the remaining seven persons would also be "Insha Allah" produced in Court on 16.8.1988 at 1.30 P.M."The DSP has been told to submit his report also on 16.8.1988. Mr. Abdus Sattar Najam, the representative of the Bar Association, shall also try to complete his report which, he has stated, is under preparation.""Order acccordingly." "Some representatives of the Press were present in the Court. They have been directed not to publish the proceedings for the time being because that might prejudice the result of these proceedings. Heowever, they have been assured that the final order would not be subject to this restriction, unless till then some such development takes placewhich compels the Court to order otherwise."It was feared that perhaps the Police, in order to avoid the charges of illegal intervention/detention and pressure at the behest of the owners, had resorted to registration of a case and had also arrested some persons; and the remaining were also thought to be under some type of detention and were neither being arrested nor were they produced, under the fear that they might divulge something'against the owners and/or the Police. In order to further know the nature of relationship between the labourers and their employers as also the police connections, it was thought necessary to ensure the production of all the persons who were allegedlyaccused persons though they appeared in reality to be bonded labour. It may be stated here that by and large all those who were arrested were being released on bail either on the asking of the Police and/or by the owner or by the Magistrate on the merits of the case. The proceedings were being held day to day in Chambers; several hours daily, were devoted to this matter. The following three orders dated 16th of August, 17th of August and 21st of August, 1988 were passed after about a fortnight of the receipt of the telegram, which would show the trend and purpose of the inquiry, Contemporaneously it was being ensured that wHerever somebody was being detained or coerced to render forced labour, should be protected. The results were being achieved in geometrical progression. "Order. (Dated 16.8.88) Muhammad Ashraf, DSP, has submitted a report in writing. He appears to have completely aligned with the Bhatta owner - in this case Rana Abdul Qayum. He has not mentioned anything about the accusation against the police about which he heard a lot in the Court proceedings. "The Additional Advocate-General Mr. Tanvir Ahamd stated that the report by the Advocate-General is under preparation and would be submitted soon. He has cited two cases from Indian jurisdiction Neeraja Choudhary AIR 1984 SC 1099 (Para 2) and AIR 1982 SC 1473) in W.P. 8143 of 1981." "Mr. Ahsanullah, who from appearance seems to be a respectable person, claiming to be a Journalist attached with a newspaper of Hyderabad and also the Chief Organizer of a Union constituted to help the Bhatta Workers, has appeared to-day with his team; including one Yaqoob an uneducated person described by Mr. Ahsanullah as his Office Secretary - presumeably of the Union. Rana Abdul Qayyum, the main actor in this entire episode has attended today. A Lawyer named Muhammad Arjf, is present presumeably with a watching brief, form Rana Abdul Qayum." "Mr. Najam, learned Advocate representing the Bar Association with Mrs. Asma Jehangir have also appeared. Mr. Najam has submitted his report in a folder with additional four folders containing photostat copies of unarranged many documents, including newspaper reports etc, which have not yet been perused on account of their bulk. Some other Members of the Bar are also present. Many other persons including the majority of alleged detenus, their partisans and theemployees of .the Bhatta owners are present. Due to paucity of space, the proceedings could not be held in the chamber. They have been held in the Court hall." "Out of the remaining seven detenus, Ashraf has appeared. Yaqoob has also appeared. He stated that Aslam is his son and that he is not in detention at the present. For some unavoidable reason, Yaqoob has explained, Aslam has not been able to attend. With regard to Akram, the DSP has produced a certificate of an Army Officer stating that he is employed in the Army in a civilian category since August 1987 and is not in detention. The Army Officer in his wisdom has not spared the allegeddetenu to appear in Court. Thus Aleam is not in detention. Out of the remaining detenus, Paloos (stated to be the younger brother of Sadiq who was present at the time of the last hearing in police custody), is stated to have gone away to unknown place and would be produced by the Police if further time is allowed. Sadiq his elder brother, according to the DSP was got released on bail by him (DSP) but strangely enough he is not present. The victim side's apprehension is that though formally released he is still in police custody. The DSP explained about Anwar and Hanif that they are under the influence of Rehmat, one of the detenus who is now free and sitting with the victim group on the benches occupied by the Union officials and other workers. It is visible that the alleged victims and other workers are in constant communication with the union officials particulary Mr. Ahsanullah while Rana Abdul Qayum and others with him, sitting alongwith the Police officials, are in constant communication with the Police. The sympathies and alignments are obviously visible. The learned Additional Advocate-General, it seems, has so far adopted an independent posture and so did the Advocate General who had appeared during the earlier hearings." "I encouraged both the sides to enter into some dialogue in Court. Accusations and counter-accusations started. The purpose was to discover as to how to procure the attendance of Paloos, Hanif and Anwar who, it seems, are no more in detention, but still under some outside control. Ultimately it was felt that Rehamt the freed detenu who is a close relation of Hanif detenu might be able to produce the latter. Regarding the two; Anwar and Paloos, it was strongly felt that they are under the influence and control of the Police, and the DSP is in a position to produce them. Accordingly, both Rehmat and the DSP were firmly told to produce them otherwise they might be dealt with under the criminal law.""During the hearing/discussion which, today also, was spread over about three and a half hours as was the previous one, three important aspects amongst many others came to light which need to be noted: "(1) During the heated discussion amongst them it came to light that some freed detenus who are present, if examined, would reveal visible marks of injuries on their body. Mr. Najam Advocate, Mr. Tanvir Ahmad, Additional Advocate-General and the DSP saw the bodies of the two Rehmats; one who has already been mentioned in these proceedings who might be described as No.l and another Rehmat who can be described as No.2. They were also seen by the Court. Rehmat No.2 was so terrified and under such strong pressure from the police, and about this there is absolutely no doubt, that he insisted that the marks of injuries on his back which obviously were the result of Sota/Danda blows, were suffered by him on account of, what he blurred out, "bricks-bricks." This was obviously false statement. The DSP also on seeing all this admitted that they were marks of Danda blows but he was hesitant tG<~ go any further; presumably because the police officialsthought that on account of the aforementioned warning with regard to non-production of theremaining detenus they might also be proceeded against for crime of omissions and commission. Similarly, the victim side was hesitant and terrified that they might be proceeded against either by the police or by the Court. Further disclosures were becoming impossible. Therefore, after careful consideration both the police and the victims as also Rana Abdul Qayum and Ahsanullah, were clearly told that whatever has happened it should be brought before the Court so that some measures should be devised for prevention in future; and further, that the Court shall not take any action with regard to what has already happened." (2) "Two ladies Mst. Reshman and Sharifan who had appeared on the last hearing, according to the victim side as freed detenus and according to the police as intruders, also appeared today and surprisingly enough they were not taking the side with the victim party instead they started accusing Rehmat No.l and Yaqoob the Office Secretary of the Union. In order to observe demeanour further the Court questioned Mst. Reshman and Sharifan separately. Both (Reshman and Sharifan) were then allowed to accuse and confront said Yaqoob in Court as they wished. Yaqoob for a while faced the questions with firmness and clear denial of allegations of exploitation. However, he was brought under pressure by the two women who subdued his voice by their shouts. Apparently Yaqoob seemed to have lost in this verbal encounter. It would be too premature to say as to who was in the right. In any case, these women are at present absolutely free though the possibility that they might have been kept in confinement by the Bhatta Walas, by the police or some clever fellow the victims' side cannot be excluded." „ (3) "Apart from Reshman, Rehmat No.l, the DSP, Younis ASI and / Rana Abdul Qayum were afforded separate opportunity of giving any information they liked, which was not audible by others sitting in the hall. It is not necessary to state here all that they said. Rana Abdul Qayum stuck to his position that he is neither an exploiter nor has he caused any physical harm to any of the victims nor he manoeuvred it through police. He insisted on his case against the victims being true. From his demeanour it did not at all, appear that if he used unlawful acts in the past against the victims, he had any intention now, to give it up. Otherwise he seems to be a respectable person. The DSP in very guarded language gave sufficient indication that the police is helpless when heavy pressures are applied upon them. He did not, at all, plead for the ASI Muhammad Younas who seems to be a major character in the episode from the police side. He, however, promised that he will help the Court in finishing the bonded labour practices about which it seems he has considerable information. Rehmat (1) still terrified was virtually speechless when he was asked to disclose the circumstances in which he was allegedly detained and physically harmed. He kept on urging that he should be helped in protecting his family. He mentioned hat he wants toarrange the marriage of his young daughter but is afraid that he might not be able to do so. Mst. Bashiran, who had appeared on the earlier hearing, a daughter-in-law of Rehmat, who was very vocal on the last hearing conspicuously, was absent today. When questioned about this, Rehmat said that they have been sent away out of fear of the Bhatta Walas and the police. When, Muhammad Younus, ASI was similarly afforded opportunity, he was first confronted with a circumstance which has come to the knowledge of the AR (1) of this Court: that he in a very extraordinary way had given photo-copy of an important official document to Rana Abdul Qayum and when further confronted with some other irrefutable circumstances almost broke down, with clamour that he should be pardoned. He has committed blunders but with similar explanation as by the DSP that the police is helpless under higher pressures. From his demeanour it did not seem that the only motive for his wrong doings was the so-called higher pressure. He happened to be a reckless youngman risen from the lower ranks. He might have felt pround of what he did including the torture to the victims presumably at the behest of Rana Abdul Qayum for obvious alignment and motives as also perhaps due to his own nature. He was clearly told that he should at least now, make a resolve not to do it in future to which he responded with a very strong promise. He was also assured that this Court would not take any action nor would direct any action against him for what has happened in past provided he keeps his promise." "The proceedings ended today with the direction to the DSP to produce Paloos and Anwar by 11 ()' clock on 18lh August, 1988, and similar directions to Rehmat (1) to produce Hanif tomorrow at any time, during the Court hours.""As on previous hearing the Members of the Bar including the learned Additional Advocate-General have been very helpful. The appearance of Mr. Ahsanullah also proved helpful as he gave the background of the bonded labour practices in the brick-kiln industry in Pakistan and his role initially as a student leader and then as a Press Reporter/Labour Union leader. It would be premature to make any further assessment about him or his organization."

"ORDER:

(Dated 17.8.88)

"Today Rehmat (1) appeared with one Barkat whose wife is the sister of Hanif detenu. Barkat explained that Hanif is not, at all, now in detention. He has gone to sonic unknown place. Two other persons also appeared. All stated that Hanif is no more in detention. He has run away on account of fear of police and is not traceable though every body having heard about him is certain that he is no more in detention." "Paloos who was required to be produced by the DSP on 18th instant has also appeared and has stated that he was afraid of the police and was hiding himself here and there. Therefore, he did not appear earlier. When asked whether he is under any detention now, he answered in the "negative". Therefore, he is also now free.""One Anwar Masih who has come with Paloos when questioned also seemed to be involved in this affair. He, to start with, tried to be clever and did not want to disclose anything. But when told that in this behalf if he declines to state the circumstances in which Paloos had appeared in Court, he might be proceeded against, he then disclosed that he had gone to the office of Ahsanullah where he found Paloos already present. He further stated that Ahsanullah has informed him that Hanif has been held by the police and is now in confinement. It is not possible to accept his statement. He himself appears to be of shady character though claims to be Bhatta labourer. If so from appearance he might be a "Jamadar" of workers in the making. However, if Ahsanullah volunteers any fresh information about Hanif that would be dealt with separately as noted earlier. All circumstances indicated that he was no more in detention. This would, however, not exclude the police or the Bhatta owners having confined him. The case would now come up tomorrow for appearance of the DSP and the remaining one detenu namely Anwar (Paloos having already appeared is no more in detention). The case regarding Hanif, as already stated, now stands closed. In these proceedings if Ahsanullah or any body else gives any information with regard to his fresh detention that would be examined separately." "Before this order could be signed, the tragic death of the President of Pakistan took place. 18th to 20th August, 1988, has been declared as mourning holidays. Court will remain closed. The case shall now come up on 21st August. 1988. The DSP who was to appear and produce Anwar on 18th shall do the same on 21st August, 1988." ORDER (Dated 21-8-1988) Anwar son of Mangoo has appeared with Nama a Jamadar. The DSP has identified him, as the last alleged detenu. He says he is free and under no detention at present. This concludes 1st step in these proceedings to achieve reasonable certainty that all the alleged detenues are at present free.""In addition to the presence as before, Ch. Mohammad Zar, Director Punjab Social Welfare Department with his team and Mr. Shahid Mahmood Nadeem reporter of Herald (the latter as a Social Worker in the field of forced labour) have also appeared.""Further statements and views heard and orders passed.""ORDER (Dated 21-8-1988)In this first case of its type, namely, public interest litigation, the Supreme Court having taken cognizance of a case of public importance for the enforcement of fundamental rights, regarding bonded labour paractices, concluded the first part of the proceedings. All the 21 detenus, who belong to brick kiln labour force and are of Christian community have been released from the alleged detention. With regard to second part, namely, prevention of the bonded labour practices in the brick kiln industry, the Court gave directions for devising long term measures. The reports have been called from the Advocate General, Punjab, the PoliceInvestigating Agency, the concerned Labour Union, the concerned Bhatta Owners Union, the Director of the Punjab Labour Welfare Department, Lahore High Court Bar Association through Mr, Abdus Sattar Najam, Advocate, and aseparate report which will be treated as confidential regarding women and children concerned in this labour problem. It has also been directed that in addition to the efforts being made to eradicate the rnal-practices in the field of labour employment in the brick kiln industry, a system should be devised to avoid all grievances/complaints of the nature dealt by the Supreme Court in this case. For that purpose, the first meeting shall be held on Thursday the 25th August 1988 at 10.00 a.m. in the office and under the chirmanship , of Advocate-General, Punjab; and in his absence, by the Additional Advocate-General. The following shall attend that meeting: -(/) Mr. Tanvir Ahmad, Additional Advocate-General; (H) A Christian church representative of high order with particularreference to the territorial area concerned; (///) A Muslim scholar Aalam/preacher having strong social influence inthe area: (/v) Mr. Muhammad Zar, Director, Punjab Social Welfare Department; (v) Mr Abdus Sattar Najam, Advocate; (w) Mr. Shahid Mahmood Nadeem, Reporter of Herald Magazine; (v/7) Kaila, a Christian labourer belonging to the actual labour force inthe brick kiln industry; (viii) Mst. Aziz Begum, representing the women and children Christianlabour force in the brick kiln industry.(ix) Mr. Ihsanullah, representing the Union for brick kiln labour; (x) Mr. Niazi, representing the brick kiln owners association; andany other person whom the chairman of the meeting might think it proper to co-opt. "2. The report about these deliberations and the measures devised therein should be with a view to enforce them from 28th August, 1988, in so far as day to day complaints are concerned. The report shall be submitted by the Advocate General on the 27th August, 1988 and will be treated as interim report. He will separately sumbit his detailed report regarding long term measures."As it would appear from the last order all labourers/detenus having been freed, it was thought necessary, to give enough time to all concerned to prepare and make their submissions in writing in the form of reports. They were allowed enough time. The matter was adjourned. During all this effort spread over about three weeks, prima-facie, it got establised that atleast in the Province of Punjab, to which the inquiry was primarily directed, there existed the practice of bonded labour in brick kiln industry; though it was not on as vast scale as it was stated to be in the neighbouring country. The level of consciousness amongst the labourers and their organizational net work was so much that by and large the cases of bonded labour and resultant illegal detention were being brought to Courts of Magistrates - mostly in proceedings under section 100 Cr.P.C. and before the High Court in the Habeas Corpus proceedings. The learned Members of the Bar were also playing a very active role. Rather it was one of the major complaints ofthe brick kiln owners that they were being pressurised by the labour class through, what they said, "bailiff action." They had also offered that if they are relieved of the so called bailiff action" they would give more concessions to the labourers. It was noticed that wherever the pressure exerted by the owner was not productive or was counter productive, local police in selected cases was being mis-used by the owners through illegal detention, torture in some cases and registration of false cases in others. The Magistracy by and large it appears was not taking sides. Individual criminal cases of detention, illegal arrest and/or false cases were being treated with sympathy for the labourers. In this very case as in many other cases brought to the notice of the Court the accused were promptly bailed out and subsequently the cases were either withdrawn or concluded without reaching their logical ends. They were- either found to be ill for release of the accused without further trial on account of the absence of evidence and/or due to false implication. In this case the District Magistrate took prompt action and passed the following Order within about a week of the pioceedings:-"Mr. Qamar-uz-Zaman Assistant District Attorney, Kasur for the state present. The petitioaer is present with his counsel Mr. Jamshed Hussain Khokhar, Advocate. The petitioner Rao Abdul Qayum son of Nazir Khan Caste Rajput r/o Bhai Pheru moved an application for withdrawal of case FIR No.319 dated 23.6.1988 under section 406/420 PPC, PS Bhai Pheru registered at the instance of said petitioner wherein he alleged that the petitioner entered into an agreement with the respondents for the preparation of earth made bricks at the @ Rs.32/- per thousand and he paid the respondent in advance individually but the respondents failed to fulfil the agreement and left the work after obtaining the amount in advance.Subsequently the parties compromised through the intervention of the respectables of the area and the complainant moved for the withdrawal of the case on 21.8.1988. After giving the due notice to the prosecution and obtaining their report the case is fixed for arguments. The arguments were heard. Statement of the complainant was recorded. The complainant also filed an affidavit in support of his petition.I have examined the Judicial file and report by the prosecution. Since the parties have compromised and the complainant is no more interested in the prosecution of the respondents the proceedings in the trial would be an exercise in futility.In view of the above, I accept the petition under section 494 Cr.P.C. and direct the prosecution to request the trial Court concerned for withdrawal of the case."Later on the learned Magistrate who had taken cognizance of the case by his Order dated 13-9-1988 concluded the case after noticing the proceedings under section 494 Cr.P.C. and also on account of reason that no case was made out against the accused.During the time that the reports were being prepared and the case stood adjourned, several applications were received from both sides making complaintsagainst each other. The labourers complained about individual forced labour and the labour malpractices while the brick kiln owners complained against the labourer as well as the labour Union for cheating mal-praclice and intimidation, particularly putting them under pressure of allegedly false complaints with the High Court and the Supreme Court. These complaints were also dealt with so as to understand the depth and extent of the forced/bonded labour practice in the brick kiln industry as also for keeping in view the causes to devise the means and measures through which a lasting solution could be found.It may be mentioned here that contrary to what had happened in the neighbouring country regarding bonded labour, the Government neither at the Federal nor at the Provincial level took sides with the employers-rather the Government agencies (other than local) particularly in the Law and Labour Offices had sympathetic, and one could say, loaded attitude in favour of the labourers. Though the local executive some times did, like the police, help the brick kiln owners; yet on the matters being reported to the Court they particularly the District Magistrates, by and large, adopted correct attitude. However, a possibility cannot be excluded that this response from the District Administration may have been due to the prompt action which was being taken by the High Court in habeas corpus jurisdiction. Otherwise a fear/possibility, which was strongly expressed existed that left to themselves the District Administration would side with the employers, and is in the habit of protecting the Police whenever it sides with them.Considerable material on various aspects of the bonded labour practices in question became available in various reports which in compliance with the directions of the Court, were submitted duly. They are as follows:-Reports of Mr. Khalil Ramdey, Advocate-General, Punjab, together with the report of Mr. Tanvir Ahmad Khan, Additional Advocate-General, two reports of Mr. Abdus Sattar Najam, a representative of Lahore High Court Bar Association; report of Mr. Ahsanullah Khan on behalf of the labourers; report of Mr. Shoaib Niaiz on behalf of the brick kiln owners; report of Director Labour Welfare Punjab; confidential report submitted by the DSP concerned; a confidential report submitted by Mrs. Asma Jehangir-particularly dealing with some matters in which an open report migh have prejudiced the interest of some innocent persons and another confidential report were, amongst others submitted to the Court. These reports be read as Schedule I (Page 1 to 107) to this judgment. (A compilation of complaints from both sides although not made part of this judgment like the reports; yet they are useful as a back-ground material in order to understand the nature of this matter. They have been compiled (Pages 1 to 205) by the office of this Court and in case of need can be referred to as appendix I to this judgment). The case again came up before me in Chambers for passing interim orders till the Court was able to deal with the matter in Court in a larger Bench in due course. All concerned were heard at length and keeping in view about hundred complaints which were brought to my notice; the proceedings in those cases; the proceedings in this case; the reports submitted in writing; and the oral submissions made by all concerned including individual labourers and brick kiln owners, the following Orders were passed on 17/18-9-1988.In the Supreme Court of Pakistan (Original jurisdiction) Present:Mr. Justice Muhammad Af/al Zullah.Mr. Khalil Ramday, Advocate-General Punjab, Mr. Tanvir Ahmad Khan, Additional Advocate-General, Punjab. Mian Abdus Saltar Najam. Advocate. Mr. M.A. Hamidi, Deputy Director, Labour. Mr. Muhammad Ashraf, D.S.P. Pattoki and all other Police officials. Mr. Khalid Mahmood, Advocate for Labourers. Mrs. Asma Jehangir for Woman and Children. Mr. Zainul Abidin, Advocate, for Anjuman-i-Malkan Bhatta Khisht, Punjab with Mr. Muhammad Shoaib Niazi, Chairman of Anjuman. Mr. Ehsanullah, President, Bhatta Ma/door Mahaz. Kela Masih Aziz Begum and many other Labourers Bhatta Owners and Office Bearers of their Anjumans. (MBC)

Orders accordingly.